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Joreword

Only within the last century, apparently, has any serious
study been made of the Jewish philosopher,·- Elilo.

Just why

a man of such ingenuity and 1ntelligenoe should be relegated
to the background is not clear. · Ferhaps, it is because Philo
occupies a unique position in the progfess of human thought.
On the one hand, he was a philosopher • . Yet, because his
philosophy lacks originality, and because he uses it so
arbitrarily, he cannot be classed among the world's great
philosophers.

On the other hand, Philo was, in a sense,

a theologian.

He was a devout Jew and, as such, had a high

regard for the Old Testament Scriptures, particularly, the
writings of Moses.

It was his avowed purpose to commend the

sacred Scriptures to the Greek world.

And yet, because of

his over-emphasis on allegory, he canno·t be regarded as a
serious interpreter of Scripture, for it is difficult to
understand a man who would cast aside the obvious meaning or
a Scriptural passage in favor of such an exaggerated use of
allegory.

Strictly speaking, then, Fhilo's system is neither

philosophy nor theology; it is a mixture of elements from
both.
But because his doctrine of the Logos is the center ot
his system, a study of Philo commends itself to every advanced
Bible student.

For this reason also we have 1n the following

pages payed particular attention to Philo's Logos concept.
We have made no special attempt to evaluate Philo's theology.
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Nor 1s it within the scope of this thesis to draw parallels
between Philo and the works of later Christian writers.

That

is a study 1n itselt.
Al+ aouroea and material used are listed in the bibliography.
The references to Philo's works are based on the Colson and
Whitaker ed1t19n (Greek and English), the Roman numerals
indicating the book 1n the treatise, the Arabio numbers denoting
the particular paragraph.
Finally, we wish to express our appreciation

to

Prof. A. M. Rehwinkel and Dr. Paul Bretscher, under whose
helpful direction this thesis 'Was written, and whose interest
in the project provided us real encouragement.

st. Louis, Missouri,

May 15, 1943

Roland A. Frantz
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Philo and Alexandrian Thought
Following the conquests of Alexander the Great, the
city of Alexandr.i a became one of' the chief' centers of'
intellectual and cfomm.ercial activity.

It was the great

world conqueror's purpose to make that city the greatest
city in the world.

His suooessors, the Ptolemies, fulfilled

this purpose • .Alexandria became the site of' a great museum,
a library containing, at a very conservative estimate,
400,000 volumes, a famous light-house, but of more importance,
the center or Greek culture and philosophy.
Numerous Jews migrated to Egypt under the Ptolemies
because of the cordial treatment they received in addition
to the grant of full citizenship.

It is estimated that at

Philo's time about a million Jews inhabited Egypt.

Also in

Alexandria, the Jewish citizenry must have been very large,
It 1s said that the synagogue there was so immense that an
official standing on a platform had to weve his head-cloth
or veil to inform the people at the back of the edifice when
to say "Amen" in response to the reader.' Naturally the

Jews

brought with them their Torah and their tradition.
Now, it is evident, that the fusion of' Greek and Jewish
1. Norman Bentwich, Philo Judaeus of' Alexandria, p. 16
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ideas was inevitable in Egypt.

The Jews there, in spite ot

their exclusive tendencies, could hardly expect to remain
aloof and absolutely untouched by the secular Gentile culture
surrounding them.
the Greek language.

For one thing, there was the influence of
Within a hundred years or their settle-

ment 1n Alexandria, Hebrew and Aramaic had become "foreign"
languages to the Jews, for they were gradually compelled to
speak the Greek.
But Hellenism had a far more pervasive influence upon
the Egyptian Jews.

Not only was their daily life, their

culture affected, but the Jews soon began to feel the forces
of Hellenism encroaching upon their religion.

It meant that

because few could read or understand the Hebrew, it was
necessary to have a Greek translation of the Holy Scriptures.
Out of this n~cessity arose the Septuagint translation, begun
during the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus, about 250 B.C.
Surrounded by pagan Egyptian and Greek cults, it is not
surprising that the more liberal-minded Jews began to be
influenced by heathenism.

No more were they in the comparative

safety and solitude of Palestine, where outside influence was
not as great, but they we,re now surrounded by people who had
a different philosophy of life, who lived and who thought
differently.

And the more liberal minded became interested

and curious to become acquainted with this new philosophy.
Nor was it only the more liberal minded who were thus affected.
The or,thodox and faithful sons of Abraham also desired to lmow
what Greek and Egyptian religion was like, because, still
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conscious of their position as God's chosen people and
therefore the possessors of divine truth, they realized
the opportunity that confronted them of proving to the
Gentiles the superiority of their own religion.
Yet aside from these factors, Judaism 1n general, be
it the liberal kind or the orthodox, could not escape
Hellenizing influences in their ~eligion.

By the very

nature ot Greek culture and thought, which is attractive
to the cultured, contemplative mind, a fertile field was
furnished the curious mind.

The Jews began to study G~eek

philosophy and to use the phrases of philosophy, so that
before long philosophy was interwoven with their religion.
Particularly, those parts 0f their doctrines which apparently
had some outward resemblance to Greek speculation gradually
came to be identified.
But the amalgamation of these two systems of thought
involved reciprocal tendencies.

Judaism did not lose its

identity completely, nor was it the passive element- in the
fusion of Greek and Hebrew thought.

The Jews never, either

as a result of subtle influence or by forceful persuasion,
gave ~P their monotheism and their venera tion for Moses and
the prophets.

As a matter of ta.ct, the Greeks, in Egypt,

too, could not escape the influence which the Jews had on
them.

Greeks and Romans becarne acquainted with Jewish

beliefs and customs.

It is believed that religion influenced

Greek philosophy perhaps to as great a degree as religion
itself ~as influenoed by Greek speculation.

The whole

- 4 ··- .... ..... - - . -·
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Neo-f!la ten-io · sys.tem1- -wh1ch--was -a- -la ter.--deveJ.Oi.)men-t ,· . was .. ... .. _ ..

essent1al~y a religious philosophy, while Alexandrian theology
was really a philosophical religion. A reason for the susceptibility of Greek thought to Hebrew religion is suggested by
Bentwich, who remarks that the Greek world was at this time
losing faith in the "poetical gods of its mythology and in
the metaphysical powers of its philosophical schools," and
was searching for something more real and reliable.

It was

attracted to Judaism, for in the place of the gods of nature,
or the impersonal world force, the Jews offered them the God
of history.~ At any rate, the evident conviction on the part
of the Jews regarding their own religion must have been an
influence on the Greeks.
The task to which Jewish philosophers set themselves,
then, was this - to harmonize Greek philosophy with Jewish
monotheism.

Their purpose was, first of all, to strengthen

the Alexandrian Jews themselves, who had undoubtedly begun
to entertain many doubts and were on the verge of apostasy,
and, secondly, to adapt the sacred Scriptures to the Greek
world.

From the very outset, the task of reconciling two

such opposing systems was almost a hopeless one, although
the Jewish philosophers believed they had accomplished this
by the use of allegory.

Allegorical interpr~tation formed

the basis of the whole Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy.

Thus,

the Jews could interpret their sacred Scriptures in terms
2. Bentwich, op. cit., p.33.

I
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of philosophy.

Ot course, a real harmony never was effected,

but the result was a new method ot exegesis, wh1ch, in turn,
produced a peculiar kind of literature.
Probably the first step in this Jewish-Hellenistic development was the Septuagint version of the Bible, which permitted
Jew and Greek to meet on common ground. The first of the
Alexandrians to use allegorical interpretation for the purpose
of harmonizing Greek ideas with the Bible is believed to be
Aristobulus.

The authenticity of his writings is disputed,

but he is supposed to have written about the beginning of the
first century B.C.

Other products of the Jewish-Alexandrian

philosophy were the Letter of Aristeas, written about ·100 B.c.,
which pretends to give an account of the origin of the
Septuagint translation, the Wisdom of Solomon, the Syb1lline
Oracles, etc. In all these works the object was to present
the God of the Jews as the only true God, and to show that
all philosophy was really dependent upon Judaism.
It remained tor Philo to put the finishing touches to
the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy.

In him the whole develop-

ment of Jewish-Greek thought reached its culmination.
its most distinguished representative.

He was

In his hands, allegory,

for the purpose of enabling the Jew and the Greek to understand each other, reached its highest development. Philo even
believed he had a sacred mission to interpret the Scriptures
to the Greeks. A great part or the Jewish-Hellenistic
literature is believed to have been lost, but in Philo's
works we have the full development or this period. Thus,

I
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Philo's works are more than the expression of an individual
mind; they are, in fact, "the record and expression ot a
great culture." 3 Although not developing a complete system,
and though he himself is often vague and even contradictory
in his teachings, he clearly shows the tendency of his age.
In the final analysis, then, it would be difficult to understand the position of such a man, particularly, wh~n he himself is inconsistent.

But, perhaps we can arrive at some

general conception of his more apparent conclusions.

That

Philo was extremely versatile cannot be denied, for he
touches upon innumerable subjects in the fields of philosophy,
science, politics, religion, law, psychology and ethics.

or

Philo's life we know very little. In fact, concerning

only one incident do we have any definite information, namely,
his mission to Rome. The precise year of his birth is not
known, but scholars are generally agreed that he was born
between 10 and 20 B.c., probably nearer the latter date.

He

was a resident of the great city of Alexandria, belonging to
one of the most distinguished and wealthiest Jewish families
or the city.

It is a question, however, whether or not he

was of the priestly rank.

Opinion is divided on this matter

and we cannot be sure. Even if this distinction were conceded
to him, it is doubtful whether such a distinguishing mark
would carry great prestige in the Hellenized city of Alexandria.

3. Bentwioh, op. cit., p. 77.

-
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His brother, Alexander Lysimachus,f one ot the foremost and
wealthiest men in the Jewish community, was magistrf\te and
alabaroh, or chief farmer of taxes on the Arabian side ot the
Nile.

It is said that at one time he lent Herod Agrippa two

hundred thousand draohmae, and that the gold and silver plates
covering the nine gates of the temple at Jerusalem were the
gift of Alexander.~ Furthermore, Alexander's two sons seem to
have followed in the socially prominent footsteps of their
father, for the one, Marcus, was married to Berenice, the
daughter of Herod, and the other, Tiberius Julius Alexander,
having deserted his religion, ventured upon a political career,
which elevated him from a general in Egypt to Roman procurator
in Palestine, and finally to a position immediately below
Titus."
Although of' such a wealthy and influential family, Philo
himself was not attracted by wealth or politics, but was of a
studious, contemplative disposition.

Yet it is rather ironical

to learn that the only incident of' his life about which there
are some details, is an incident which involves him in a
serious political situation.

That event was his journey to

Rome, in the year 40 A.D., as the head of' an embassy of tive,
to plead the case of his people before the emperor G'e.ius
Caligula.

According to the decree of the emperor, his own

4. In his History of Israel, Ewald questions this relationship between Philo and Alexander, contending that, according to
newly discovered passages, Alexander was Philo's nephew. But
more recent scholars make no mention of these "newly discovered
passages" and regard the two men as brothers.
5. Erwin Goodenough, An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, p.3.
6. Ibid.' P• 4. f.tR.ITZLAFF 1-·11:: ~OP.IAL LIBRA-RY
CONCO: :· \ :.: ·

:1~ARY
ST. LC UlS, .3;10,
1
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. statue was to be plaoed in all Jewish temples, and was to be
~orshipped.

This the Jews refused to do, and, as a result,

they wer.e p·e rseouted.

When it was deoided that a speoial

~mbassy should be sent to Rome to ask that the Jews be exempted
from paying the ~mperor divine honors, Philo, no .d oubt beoause
of his great reputation and patriotism, was ohosen at the head.
The mission was unsuocesstul. Phi-l o and his colleagues were
mocked and made sport ot, Ph1lo'e brother was thrown into
prison {to be re.l eased later by Claudius .wh.o se friendship he
had gained), and the rest of them fled.

For a man so devoted

to his people and to their tradition, this must have been a
bitter disappointment for Philo, and we are, perhaps, sate in
assuming that some of those treatises in which he attacks the
Gentiles, were written after, and were the result ot., this
shameful treatment on the part of Caligula. From now on, says
Bentwich, "he was the public defender as well as the teacher
of his people." 7
Now upon the dating or this event in the year 40 A.D., to
which historians agree, is based the chronology of Philo's
life, as well as the apparent change in his outlook on lite.
In a treatise describing the ~vents of A.D. 40 he speaks ot
himself as an old man ( {E.ewv
) , and from this 1 t is oonjeotured
'
that he was born about 20

B.c.

As to the date ot his death,

it is also assumed that he died about the year 50 A.D.

At

least, this is aocepted by most writers. In Jewish history,
,:·Bentwioh, op. oit., P• 45.
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then, Philo's lite was contemporaneous with the reigns of
King Herod, his sons, and King Agrippa.

He was al~o partly

contemporary with .Hillel, who came from Babylon to Jerusalem
in 30 .B.O.

The period ot his teaching is practically simul-

taneous with that of Jesus, .John the Baptist, and partly with
the life of Paul.

or

the rest of Philo's life we have no

authentic info~mation.
As to his personal character and way of lite we are
entirely dependent upon passages taken from his own writings,
and even from these we learn very little, tor Philo was not
given to speak or himself.

But an occasional passage reveals

the type ot person that he was.

Already from his early youth

Philo devoted himself to a life of contemplation and study.
In spite of his being born under wealthy and socially prominent
circumstances, he spurned love of the world and devoted himself
to philosophy.

He regarded it as man's highest duty to study

the Law and to strive to know God. We shall point out later
how this was to be accomplished.

But it should be remarked

here that there is a two-fold stage in Philo's approach to
this attainment of righteousness.

In his early days Philo

regarded the way to virtue and happiness to lie in the solitary
and ascetic life.

He looked upon the world and society as evil,

so that man should flee from these things it he would know God. 8
Accordingly, he spent his youth and early manhood in studying

a~ While Philo was in sympathy with ascetic ideas and
habits, especially those of the Essenes, and although he speaks
of a Jewish brotherhood of ascetics living alone near the mouth
of the Nile, he now~ere says that he belonged to their society.
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philosophy and in contemplating the universe.
But, apparently, in his maturity Philo reversed h1mselt.
He no longer regarded as~eticism as the ideal way of lite, but
looked ~p~n moderation as the road to righteousness.

This

dualism in his point of view, this conflict between the
contemplative and the practical life, is best seen trom his
own words.

In one pa!3sage he says of himself:

"There was a time when I had leisure for philosophy
and for the contemplation of the universe and its
contents, when I made its spirit my own in all its
beauty and loveliness and true blessedness, when
my constant companions were divine themes and
verities, wherein I rejoiced with a joy that never
cloyed or sated. I had no base or abject thoughts
nor grovelled in search or reputation or of wealth
or bodily comforts, but seemed always to be borne
aloft into the heights with a soul possessed by
some God-sent inspiration, a fellow-traveller with
the sun and moon and the whole heaven and universe •." 'I
In another place he says:
"For many a time have I myself forsaken friends and
kinsfolk and country and came into a wilderness, to
give my attention to some subject demanding
contemplation, and derived no advantage from doing
so, but my mind scattered or bitten by passion has
gone o~f to matters of tµe contrary kind. Sometimes,
on the other hand, amid a vast throng I have a
collected mind. God has dispersed the crowd that
besets the soul and taught me that a favourable and
unfavourable condition ar~ not brought about by
difference ot place, but by God who moves and leads
the car ot the soul 1n whatever way He pleases." 10
It may well be that the fortunes of his fellow-Jews in
Alexandria, their persecution and hardships, contributed to
this reversal of attitude and to his involvement in publ1o
affairs, tor he was truly a Jew devoted to his people.

a.

The Special Laws, III, l.
10. Allegorical Interpretation, II, 85.

But
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whatever the cause

may be,

a change or attitude.

it is obvious that he did experience

The solitary, contemplative life emerged

into the social and active life.

Nevertheless, Philo was far

from giving up his contemplation and ~peculation even in his
later years, .for, indeed, this was the way to know God.
Be.1 ng intensely interested in learning, he early acquired
an .education in all the subjects prominent in his day.

Because

or his family's wealth, and because the city or Alexandria was
then the chief center of the world's wisdom, Philo had unusual
opportunities for education.

He busied himself with all

branches of learning, becoming acquainted with Greek, Egyptian,
Chaldean, Persian and even Indian thought.

He studied, and

.

became well versed in, all the prominent schools ot philosophy
of his day - Platonic, stoic, Skeptic and Pythagorean.

It is

said, he became "the most distinguished Platonist of his age,""
and oan be regarded as "representative of the best attainments
of the J'udeanism of that age." 1~
But Philo was more than a pedantic intellectual.

He was

sincere, was devoted to Scripture and to the welfare of his
people, and he loved virtue.

While he was,

.by

and large, not

an ascetic, neither did he countenance hilarious living.

He

disapproved of the ostentation of Alexandrian society, and he
rebukes the idolatry of the Egyptians.

His advice was to avoid

the t:wo extremes and to choose the middle course, the way of
temperance and virtue. 13 Philo was truly a · man of high moral
11. Bentwioh, op. cit., P• 48.
12. Georg Ewald, History of Israel, Vol. VII, p. 195.
13. It 1s true, this does not agree with his earlier views,
but I think we are justified in regarding his more mature outlook
on life as rep~esentative ot the man.
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character, and his devotion to the Law and to the Scriptures
is hard to match.

In his views on practical life it 1s some-

times amazing to note the outwar.d resemblance to Christian
principles.

~!oreover, simplicity of 11:te was evidently

emulated by Philo's wife.

The story is told that, when asked

why she, who was so rich, did not wear the costly ornaments
and jewelry peculiar to her social standing, replied. "The
virtue of the ·husband is adornment enough for the wite."'"'
Although living in Alexandria practically all his lite,
Philo is known to have made .one other journey outside Egypt,
besides his trip to Rome.

In his treatise De Providentia he

speaks of going to Jerusalem to worship - as every faithful
Jew was wont to do.

This probably occurred about 30 A~n~,

during the reign of Agrippa, who was a personal friend of
Philo's family.,.,
As far as his outward life and circumstances are concerned,
this is about all we know of ,Philo.

But of his thoughts and

attitudes and convictions we learn more from his writings.

In

fact, as we study the nature of his works and observe the methoi
of his approach, Philo emerges as a man of many aspects.

He is

a profound, though not always a Qonsistent, thinker, and his
writings have assumed voluminous proportions.
,.

It is believed

that those works which are extant form only about one half of
his total writings.
In order to understand Philo at all, one must understand
14. Heinrich Graetz, History ot the Jews, Vol. II, p~ 186.
15. Bentwich, op. cit., P• so.
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his method of interpretation.

To Philo, allegory was the key

which unlooked the Scriptures.

To be sure, he was not the

first to employ allegory, but he certainly gave it new importance.
It is perhaps not saying too much to remark that under Philo
allegory was used as it had never been used before.
When we think of the task to which Philo addressed himself,
we begin to ·s~e why allegory played such a prominent part in
his system, yes, why it was the center and core of his system.
Philo was essentially a Jew.

He regarded the Old Testament,

especially the Mosaic Law, as the supreme authority, venerating
it "as if it were God."

He adhered strictly to the inspiration

of the Holy Scripture, ree'}lrding every word, every .letter as
divinely inspired.

For him, Moses was the supreme philosopher

and law-giver of the world.

Accordingly, the Greek philosophers

and poets were but "broken lights" of Mose.a .

Thus, in Philo' s

estimation the Pentateuch was the source of the highest wisdom,
and while the other Old Testament writers were also inspired,
they were merely disciples ot Moses.
On the other hand, Philo was a Greek philosopher, having
w

beoome acquainted \1th, and holding in high esteem, the
prominent philosophies of the day, esp_e oially, that ot Plato.
In fact, he thought so much of Plato and borrowed so extensively
from him, that it has been said, "either Philo Platonizes or
Plato Philonizes." But inasmuch as he borrowed freely from
several other philosophic systems, notably the Pythagorean and
stoic, he is very properly called an eolectio.
Philo's task was to reconcile Greek philosophy and culture
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with traditional Jewish faith.

His purpose was two-told.

In

the first place, he wanted to show that between taith and
philosophy there was no conflict and, secondly, he wi~hed to
establish the Torah as well as Judaism on a firm foundation
for the edification of the man of outside culture.

The result

was that "to the Greek world he offered a philosophic religion,
to his own .people a reiigious philosophy."''
But was it possible to accomplish this task?

Could a

divine revelation be harmonized with human speculat~on? Could
monotheism be reconciled with polytheism?
found the answer.

Philo believed he

True to his Jewish faith, he subordinated

Greek philosophy to the Hebrew Scriptures, and with the
instrument of allegory he worked out his doctrines.

His premise

is that the Greek philosophers borrowed from the Old Testament
and from Moses.

He attempts . to show that whatever good is

found in the Greek philosophemes was nothing original, but
that, on the contrary, Moses had taught it · long ago.

Yet,

I think, it would be more correct to say that, actually, Philo
borrowed many of his doctrines from the Greeks and, using
Scripture in a very loose way, tried to create the impression
that the Greeks borrowed them from Moses.
However. _Philo's task was a rather hopeless one, and no
matter how sincere and earnest may have been his effort at
harmonizing these two modes of thought, "the amalgamation is
somewhat external and incomplete.«/7 Philo was striving to
16. Bentwioh~ op. cit., P• 96.
17. Edward Oaird, The Evolution ot Theology: in the Greek
Philosophers, Vol. II, P• 190.
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reconcile opposites.

As Oal~d has put it, "the Hebrew mind 1 8
.

.

intuitive, imaginative, almost incapable of' analysis or ot
systematic connection of. ideas", while "the Greek mind, on the
other hand, is essentially discursive; analytical, and systematic, governing itself even in its highest flights by the ideas
of measure and. symmetry, of logical sequence. and connection."''
These two divergent systems of thought -- the one, ~eason, the
other, revelation -- Philo tried to reconcile.

While a general

failure to attain this objective was, by the very nature or the
c.ircumstances, precluded, Philo saw no difficulty in his attempt,
and actually worked out a detailed system.

By the use of'

allegory he believed he found the answer.
Yet, while the method of allegory was a highly serviceable
instrument in the approach to the problem, it was, actually a
necessary instrument.

It was, perhaps, the only vehicle which

could convey Greek thought to the Jewish mind and vice versa.
And so, allegorical exposition became almost a necessity with
Philo, so that "had he not already found it in use, he would
doubtless have invented it."11
Philo's general principle is that, in addition to the
literal meaning for the common man, the Bible has a hidden and
deeper meaning for the philosopher.

Not everyone is able to go

beneath the surface and learn the true meaning; only the man
who is practiced in philosophy and meditation can do this.
s cripture is a sort of palimpsest.

Thus,

In studying the Scripture,

18. Ibid., P. 188ft.

19. Graetz, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 210.
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one should give heed, not only to the words and terms, but
to the spirit of the writings, because the true meaning lies
under the surface, and words are only a means of conveyance
7"I

aoco~odating to man.

On this point Philo says:

"We should look on all these outward observances as
resembl.ing the body, and their inner meanings as
resembling the soul. It follows that, exactly as
we have to take thought for the body, because it is
the abode of the soul, so we must pay heed to the
letter of the laws. If we keep and observe these,
we shall gain a clearer conception of those things
of which these are symbols. 11 .io
That his method lacked system and consistency seems to be
of no concern to Philo.

He employs it at his own pleasure, so

that it becomes an instrument by which he can deduce anything
from anything.

In fact, it is so flexible, that he is known

to take a certain passage and deduce different ideas from the
same terms, or to apply wholly different terms to the same
idea.

In reality, his own practice is inconsistent with his

theory, for, on the one hand, he firmly believes in the verbal
i nspiration of Scriptures, whose teachings contain the highest
and ultimate truth, while, on the other hand, because of his
preconceived notions, he introduces foreign matters into the
text of scripture, which render verbal i nspiration null and
void, and thus he becomes involved in a vicious circle.
Moreover, he feels free at any time to take a Hebrew name or
word, substitute some supposed Greek equivalent, and then
ramble on in his exposition.

In itself this is certainly a

dangerous and misleading method.

But when a man of Philo's

ingenuity and imagination employs such a method of
20. On The Migration of Abraham, 93
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interpretation, we are not surprised at the tar-fetch~d and,
at times, nonsensical thoughts that are deduced.
The d1ff1cul.t y now arises, how, if the very words of the
Hebrew text are inspired, can we be sure that the Gr~ek text
has caught the meaning.

For Philo this was no problem,

because he regarded the LXX also as verbally inspired.~'
Inspiration was ascribed to the translators even in the choice
of words, and hence, he bases all his arguments on the LXX.
But this, too, seems to have been a necessity for Philo.
Ignorant of, or at best, only superficially acquainted with,
Hebrew, he was compelled to use the Greek in his study.

At

the same time he freely takes a Hebrew name and promiscuously
substitutes some Greek term, or he interprets a Hebrew word
according to Greek etymology.

It is not surpria ·\ng then, that

his entire treatment and application of the Bible becomes
defective and false.

It is true, he does not impress one as

being whimsical in his approach, or indifferent to falsification,
for he seems to have pursued his task with all seriousness,
and apparently believed he was expounding the original and
only true meaning.

But he was unconsciously led to an

exaggerated use of allegory.

Everything in the Pentateuch,

its historical significance being obliterated, was interpreted
allegorically, and, as a result, personages and places became
"the cold puppets of a mystical philosophy. ".u. l!.'Ven within
21. It is a controversial point whether Philo had any
knowledge of the Hebrew language. Several authorities believe
that he was entirely ignorant of Hebrew, while the most that
is said for him on this point is that he had a working knowledge
of Hebrew.
22. James Drummond, Philo Judaeus, Vol. I, p. 22.
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Judaism, this promiscuous use of allegory threatened to
have evil consequences, because it led to two extremes.
Some disregarded the literal sense and began to allegorize
away the law, including numerous ceremonial observances.
It is even said that allegory became so general and intriguing
that the masses lost all interest 1n the simple stories ot
the Holy Scripture, and "took more delight in artitioial
explanations than in the plain lessons and sublime laws ot
their sacred books. n.23 Others adhered strictly to the literal
sense ot Scripture and rejected allegory.

Philo seems to

have chosen the middle course, being "liberal in thought and
conservative in practice."~¥
Though our religious philosopher had no definite system
nor any definite rules regarding his allegory, he does seem
to follow for definite reasons various principles.

For one

thing, everything anthropomorphic had to be changed into some
spiritual or philosophic truth.

He regarded it as being

unworthy of God to speak of Hirn as having arms, a body, or as
laughing or repenting.

These were merely forms of speech for

man's accornrnodation, but were unsuited to the Deity.

Further-

more, the literal sense must ·be excluded wherever Scripture
seems to be involved in a discrepancy, as, for exani:ple, where
numbers or relationships 1n a particular ~amily seemingly do
not agree.

Finally, allegorical interpretation must be used

wherever scripture seems to require it, as, for instance, when
23. Graetz, op. oit., Vol. II, p. 209.
24. Bentwich, op. cit., P• 40.

...,
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it speaks of the trees ot ·knowledge, and ot lite, or of the
serpent speaking. ' These seem to be general principles which
he followed in his interpretation.~'With the use of such
principles the bars are let down and the doors are wide open
for arbitrary and subjective interpretation.

He defies the

rules of hermeneutics and gets around this by saying that
only the higher and more capable minds can understand the
deep~r meanings of Scripture.

Accordingly, he at times,

offers some interesting and thought-provoking conclusions,
but only too often he toys with the sacred Scriptures and
deduces some fantastic explanations.

Ot course, his difficulty

lay in his purpose, with the result that "the Scriptures are
ruthlessly robbed of their historical significance, and made
the scaffolding for the erection of a philosophical system
in many respects alien to their real meaning. 11

.t'

A word may be said about Philo's writings.

We are

accustomed to refer to Philo as a philosopher, but he really
had no definite, coherent philosophic system.

His purpose

was to defend the teachings of Moses ~d to show that they
contained the highest philosophical truth, and not to write

a new philosophy.

For that reason he never traces a

philosophical question to its logical conclusion.

Rather is

his philosophy in the form of biblical exposition, or as
Zeller puts it, it is "Jewish theology mixed with Greek
25. It may be, according to Drummond, that a school or
alle,gortoal expositors existed at Philo's time, which had
fixed laws by which they were guided.
26. William Fairweather, Jesus and the Greeks, p. 186
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mysticism"f7 rather than real philosophy.

Taking the

Pentateuch, he proceeds verse by verse and gives an
exegesis of the Scriptures, all the while injecting into
it, by means or allegory, his philosophical ideas.

Thus,

his works are nothing but philosophical commentaries on
the books ot Moses, inasmuch as his various conceptions,
which lie scattered up and down his writings, are all based
on the Jewish, more particularly, the Mosaic viewpoint.
One reason tor the laok ot consistency .in his writings,
other than the impossibility of his task, is that he himself
deals with Biblical material in different ways.

Recalling

that Philo really lived a double life, we are not surprised
that the interpretations of his maturer years differed from
those of his earliest writings.

Hence, it becomes more

difficult to understand the man.

The problem would be less

difficult, of course, if we could place the various treatises
in the proper period~ of his life.

Then, at least, we could

come to some sort of conclusion as to how his views developed
and what could be regarded as an established conviction.

But

since, as Bentwich remarks, "the chronology of Ph1lo's
;.1

writings is as uncertain as the chronology or his life," we
shall probably never know how to interpret the man on some
points.
Another reason for his inconsistency in dealing with
Biblical material is that different treatments were meant for
27. Eduard Zeller, Outlines of the Historz of Greek
Philosophy, p. 264.
28. Op. cit., P• 77.
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In general, Philo defends his religion

especially against three classes of opponents.

First of all,

he inveighs against the scoffers among the Jews themselves,
those who have deserted their Jewish faith.

Next, a great

part of his writing is directed toward those within Judaism
who were coming to admire Chaldean astrology
inclining towards Greek culture.

and

who were

A third portion 9f his

writings is meant for the ordinary heathen, particularly,
the Egyptians with their animal-worship!' Throughout his
writings Philo maintains a dignified attitude, and he very
rarely mentions his opponents' names.

His language, too, is

elevated and mannerly.

29. Ewalq, op. cit., Vol. VII, P• 200ff.
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II
Doctrine of God
In studying Philo's doctrine of God, we notice especially
two points from which he proceeds, namely, the existence of
God and the nature of God.

Concerning the first point, Philo

is deeply imbued with the conviction that God exists.

To a

devout Jew this could not be otherwise, for the sacred
Scriptures establish this fact.

And yet, for the sake or

the heathen, Philo relies on philosophical arguments to prove
God's existence.

In the case of God's nature he 1s, for the

most part, content to rely on the teachings of Moses.
In Philo's day there were many theories concerning the
existence of God.

There were skeptics who doubted God's

existence, atheists who said there was no God at all, polytheists who believed that many gods existed, pantheists who
believed God to be manifested in every object.

Over against

these divergent theories Philo introduced the God of Judaism,
and he tries to prove His existence by rational arguments.'
In a general way, says Philo, the true God may be known
by

contemplating nature.

He uses the analogy of microcosm

and macrocosm, showing that God js in the universe in the
same way tha t the invisible mind is in man.

EVen as the mind

rules all the parts of the body, so all the parts of the cosmos
must be ruled by a Supreme Being.

Secondly, the existence

God may be proved by the intuitions of the soul.
1. see his treatise, On the Creation

or

For example,
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when we oontemplate art or painting, we cannot do so without
believing that someone created that piece ot art or did that
painting.

so, too. 1n the oosmos.

The multitudinous phenomena

which we see and experience must be the work of a Creator.
tuiother argument is that of oausality.

Just as any work ot

art cannot come about by itself, neither can
the universe evolved by itself.

'Rs

-suppose that

On the contrary, there must

have been a first cause, something whic~ gave shape and form
to shapeless matter.

Furthermore, the orderly arrangement in

the universe suggests some law or reason acting upon it.

As

a result, Philo attributes this cause to mind.1 The Supreme
Mind is the original cause of the universe.
But there 1s a higher mode by which God may be apprehended.
While ordinary men must be content with the knowledge of God
gained indirectly, the more perfect and purified minds can
apprehend Him through more direct manifestations; "Those who
strove to see God from the creation were confined to conjecture;
but those pursued the truth who perceived God by means of God,
light by means of light."" This idea is expressed through an
allegory of Abraham.

When Scripture says that Abraham left

his c-o untry, and his kindred and his father's house{ this,
according to Philo, means that he put off the body, sensible
perception, and speech, so that only when the bodily things
2.

3.
will be
4.
5.

...

Yov.s
This distinction between superior and inferior minds
discussed under the doctrine of man.
Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 5.
Genesis 12, lff.
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were cast aside did God appear to h1m.• In other words, the
higher lite, the lite that is removed from the busy w:,rld
to solitude and retirement and has conquered the senses -that is the life that attains to a more direct knowledge ot
God.

In this doctrine that the highest intuition, the

spiritual intuition, is capable of seeing God, ffe have Fhilo's
mysticism.

Aooording to his doctrine, the goal of the

righteous man is to arrive at this vision of God, and, having
done that, to enjoy · the oommunion· with the Divine.

Thus,

Philo based his belief in the existence of God on the apparent
orderly arrange~ent in the universe, upon the evidences of
causality in the oosmos, and upon spiritual intuitions.

These

three, says Philo, prove that God exists and that He is
independent of everything else.
However, of more importance is Philo's teaching concerning
the nature of God.

That God exists is an unquestioned fact.

But matters are not so simple when it comes to learning who
God is, for here there is room tor much speculation.

Now, if

any certain conclusion oan be drawn from Philo's system, it
is this that God is a transcendent God.

He is entirely

separate from man and the world, incapable of coming into
contact with anything finite.

In this respect, he agrees with

Old Testament theology, which speaks of God's wisdom transcending the worldi and of man's inability to behold God. 8

er.

On the Migration of Abraham.
7. Isaiah 55, 9.
a. Exodus 33, 20.
6p
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In keeping with this lofty conception, Philo regards
God as transcending all description.

Simply because He 1s

so elevated above the world, and because we thus are µnable
to know Him, nothing positive can be said ot Him.

That which

is begotten cannot comprehend that which is unbegotten.

Thus,

ro ov.

God's

appealing to Exodus 3, 14 (LXX), Philo calls God

nature is inexpressible by any name, for, Philo points out,
God refers to Himself as "I am that I am.".f Hence, we know
only that He is and not what He is.

We know him only negatively

and not positively, because all those names by which we, in
human speech, are accustomed to call Rim are only predicates
which contrast his infinite Being with the finite characteristics of the world.

While God's creatures are definitely

related to Him~ He is in no way related to them.

He alone is

self-sufficient, transcendent, changeless, eternal, without
quality.
The point from which Philo proceeds is the antithesis
of God and the world, the Infinite and the finite • . For this
reason Philo makes an effort to explain away the anthropomorphic and anthropopathic statements concerning God in the
Old Testament.

He regarded it as impious to speak of God as

having any of the characteristics of a created being. According
to Philo, such terms are used only for the accommodation of
those who are unable to understand.

Not everyone has the same

gift of thought and the ability to interpret.

Thus, ror our

benefit, Scripture has pictured God in such terms so that we
9. · Exodus 3, 14.
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may kn.ow of his existence •. Furthermore, human language itself
is inadequate to express the true conception of God.

To these

ideas Philo gives expression in the following passage:
"God being uncreated and the Author of the creation
of the others needs none of the properties which
belong to the creatures which He has brought into
being. For consider, if He uses our bodily parts
or organs He has feet to move from one place to
another. But whither will He go or walk since His
presence fills everything? To whom ~11 He go,
when none is H1s equal? And for what purpose will
He walk? .For it cannot be out of care for health
as it is with us. Hands H..e must have to receive
and give. Yet He receives nothing from anyone, for,
besides that He has no needs, all things are His
possessions, e.nd when He gives, He employs as ·
minister ot His gifts the Reason wherewith also He
made the worid. Nor did He need eyes, which have
no power of perception without the light which meets
our sense·. But that light is created, whereas God
saw before creation, being Himself His own light.
Why need we speak of the organs . of nourishment? If
He has them, He eats and is filled, rests awhile and
after the rest has need again, and the accompaniments
of this I Will not dwell upon. These are the mythical
fictions of the impious, who, professing to represent
the deity as of human form, in reality represent Him
as having human passions.
"Why then does Moses speak of feet and hands, goings
in and goings out in connexion with the Uncreated, or
o~ His arming to defend Himself against His enemies?
For he describes Him as bearing a sword, and using as
His weapons minds and death-dealing fire (thunderbolt
and storm blast the poets call them, using different
words, and say they are the weapons· of the Cause). Why
again does he speak of His jealousy, His wrath, His
moods of anger, and the other emotions similar to them,
whioh he describes in te~ms of human nature? But to
those who ask. .these questions Moses answers thus:
'Sirs, the lawgiver who aims at the best must have one
end only before him - to benefit all whom his work
reaches. Those to whose lot has fallen a generously
gifted nature and a training blameless throughout, and
who thus find that their later course through life
lies in a straight and even highway, have truth for
their fellow-traveller, and being admitted by her into
the 1nt'allible mysteries of the Existent do not overlay the conception of God with any of the attributes
of created being. These find a moral most pertinent
in the oracles of revelation, that 'God is not as a
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man' nor yet is He as the heaven or as the universe.
These last are forms of a particular kind which
present themselves to our senses. But He is not
apprehensible even by the mind, save in the fact
that He is. For it is His existence which we
apprehend, and of what lies outside that existence
nothing. But they whose m tural wit is more dense
and dull, or whose early training has been mishandled, since they have no. power of clear vision,
need physicians in .the shape of admonishers, who
will devise the treatment proper to their present
condition. Thus ill-disciplined and foolish slaves
receive profit f'ro.m a master who ·f rightens them, tor
they fear his threats and menaces and thus involuntarily are schooled by fear. All such may well
learn the unt1Uth, which will benefit them, if they
cannot be brought to wisdom by truth."/O

It is clear that Philo regarded God as incapable of being
comprehended.

The best we can do is to think of Him as being,

entirely free from all quality or limitations, or as Philo puts
it:

"Nothing that can give assurance can give positive
assurance touching God, for to none has He shown His
nature, but He bas rendered it invisible to our
whole race. Who oan assert of the First Cause either
that It is without body or that It is a body, that rt
is of such a kind or that It is of no kind? In a
word who can make any positive assertion concerning
His essence or quality or state or movement?"ll
Yet Philo did not rob God of personality.

On the contrary,

he regarded God as a personal God, the divine, self-determining
Mind.

This he asserts in the words:
· "Moses, both because he had attained the very summit
of philosophy, and because he had been divinely
instructed 1n the greater and most es~ential }'.8rt of
Nature's lore, could not fail to recognize that the
universal must consist of two parts, one part active
cause and the other passive object; and that the
10. On the Unohangeableness of God, 56-64.
11. Allegorical Interpretation, III, 206.
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active Cause is the perfectly pure and unsullied
Mind of the universe, transcending virtue, transcending knowledge, transcending the good itself
and the beautiful itself; while the passive part
is in itself incapable of life . and motion, but,
when set in motion and shaped and quickened by
Mind, changes into the most perfect masterpiece,
namely this world."'~
As the rational Cause, God is in distinct antithesis to
creation.

Moreover, He exercises a continual causa~ity,

forever holding the world together and preventing it from
disintegrating and vanishing.

But our best efforts in searching

for God will be rewarded only in being able "to .comprehend that
God in his essential being is absolutely incomprehensible, and
to see that He is not to be seen".'3
One of these negative predicates by which God is described
is His namelessness.

Since the essence of the Divine Being is

unknown, therefore, God is without a name, at least as far as
we human beings are concerned.

To prove this doctrine, Philo

appeals to the incident in Scripture where God appeared to
Moses 1n the burning bush and called Himself,

"I am that I am".

This suggests to Philo that God is without a proper name, and
is referred to merely as being.
Him who is 1nf'inite.

No name is to be applied to

Names are characteristic of finite and

created things only/~ If we do call God by some particular
name, it is only because our minds are imperfect and we need

12. On the Creation, 8-9.
13. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 20.
14. On the Life of Moses, I, 74-76.
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some mode or way of referring to him.

Yet no single name

exhausts or describes the essence of God.
Still on th.e negative side, we notice, in the next place,
tha.t God is without qualities.'5 ~o description can be applied

to Him because He transcends all qualities, because "he is
above them, owing nothing to them, but being himself the _liv1ng
source f'rom whi,ch they emanate."'' According to Philo, 11' we
ascribe qualities to God we immediately place him in a class,
to which others may belong_.
of God.

This would be entirely unworthy

Thus, . the best we can do is to reg~rd him as without

quel1t1es, a -sel~.- existent _B eing· whose essenc.e is absolutely

sui generis.

Thia idea Philo expresses in the tollowing

passage:
"For not even the whole world would be a place tit
for God to make His abode, since God is His own
place, and He is tilled by Himselt, and sutfioient
for Himself, filling and containing all other things
in their destitution and barrenness and emptiness,
but Himself contained by nothing else, seeing that
He is Himself One and the Whole." 11
This complete transcendence of God Philo speaks ot in
another passage, in which he indicates that, though we may
know of God!s existence, it is impossible to know His essence.
"Yet the vision [of God, gained by the righteous man]
only showed that He is, not what He is. For this
which is better than the good, more venerable than
the monad, purer than the unit, cannot be d1Soerned
by anyone else; to God alone is it permitted to
apprehend God," 'ti
15.

.,,
o'-TT0l05

16. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 24.
17. Allegorical Interpretation, I, 44.
18. On Rewards and Funishments, 59-40.
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Thus God is superior to all description, tor everything
that is good and perfect and blessed is comprehended in God,
but is only a part ot His full essence.
Now with such a lofty conception of God it might be
expected that P~ilo would stop at this point and be content
with the incomprehensibility of God.

On

the contrary, he is

not satisfied wi.t h purely negative conceptions, but freely
ascribes positive d.e sori.ptions to the self-existent Being.
In this appa.rent contradiction critics of Philo have revelled.
They have pointed out that this is an instence of glaring
inconsistency, for, on the one hand, Philo denies all attributes
to God, and, o·n the other, he ascribes attributes · to Him.

The

difficulty, no doubt, arose from Philo's attempt to solve
rationally the problems of transcendence and immanence.

Philo

has no doubt about the transcendence of .God, and he was equally
convinced that God acts upon the world.
positive properties.

The latter implies

For Philo or, for that matter, for anyone

who tries with human reason to find a solution to a problem
containing two such irreconcilable elements, the difficulty is
obvious.

Philo*s whole Logos doctrine is an attempt to

reconcile these opposites, an attempt to link the infinite with
the finite.

Thus, to explain the jmmanence of God, it was

necessary to presuppose positive properties.

We use the word

''properties" advisedly, for Philo makes the distinction between
qualities and properties.

While Ood can be regarded as having

only negative qualities, He does have positive properties. 19 I t
19. Cf. Allegorical Interpretation, II, 79ft.
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there is any essential difference between the two outside
.

.

the sphere of philosophy, we ere not aware or it.

But Philo

was, after all, a philosopher, and .we will have to try to
observe his distinction.
Accordingly, then, Phiio ascribes eternity to God. Since
God is the oaus·e and the mind of the universe, He must be
eternal, for it He were not eternal, He could not be the
first oause and the source of all things.

This eternity ot

God is expressed in the following passage:
"Who then is he that sows in them the good seed
save the Father of all, that is God unbegotten
and begotten of all things." ~ 0
All other tbings have come into being by creation, but
God alone is without beginning and the Father of all.
this respect He is different from everything else.

In

Further-

more, since creation implies change, God, who 1s uncreated,
is necessarily unchangeable and, consequently, incorruptible.
This incorruptibility, together with the unity of God, is
expressed thus:
"God is alone, a Unity, in the sense that His nature
is simple not composite, whereas each one of us and
of all other created beings is made up of many things.
I, for example, am many things in one. I am soul and
body. To soul belong rational and irrational parts,
and to body, again, different properties, warm and
cold, heavy and light, . dry and moist. But God is not
a composite Being, consisting of many parts, nor is
He mi.Xed with aught else. For whatever is added to
God, is either superior or inferior or equal to Him.
But there is nothing equal or superior to God. And
no lesser thing is resolved into Him. It He do so
assimilate any lesser thing, He also will be lessened.
And if He can be made less, He will also be capable
of corruption; and even to imagine this we.re
20. On the Cherubim, 44
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blasphemous. The none" and the "monad" are. therefore,
the only standard for determining the oategory to
which God belongs. Rather should we say. the One God
is the sole standard for the nmonad". For. like time,
all number 1s subsequent to the universe; end God is
prior to the universe, and 1s 1 ts UiOker." ~,
Other attributes or properties upon which we need not
elaborate, and which we should expect to ~e in.eluded in ?hilo•s
lofty conception of Goci are His 1nvis1bil1 ty/J. His omnipresence:'

His transcendi ng space and time;" His omn1sc1encefs- His
omnipotence;' His complete perteet1on •.t 7
To one particular attribute, however, some attention must
be given, namely 1 God's goodness. for this brings us to matters
oonce~ning creation and providence.

In connection with God's

goodness we find .Philo•s answer to the reason tor creation and
providence.

This is expressly stated in his treatise On the

Cherubim:

"For to bring anything into being needs all these
conjo1nt1y, the "by which"• the tttrom which", the
"through whioh v• , the "for which", and the first
of these 1s the cause, the second the material,
the third the tool or instrument, and the fourth
the end or object. If we ask what combination is
always needed that a house or city should be built 1
the ans\',er is a builder, stones or timber, and
instruments. ¥hat 1s the builder but the cause
"by w.hich"? What are t he stones and t imber but
the material "from whiob"? What are the instruments
but the meons nthrough which"? And what is the end
or object ot the building but shelter and safety,
end this oonsti tutes the "tor which•'. Let us leave
these merely partioular bu1ld1ngs, and contemplate
~l. AlleP.Or1oal Interpretation, II, 2-3.
22. on Abraham, 76.
23. On the Confusion of Tongues, 134•139.
24 .. ~iho is the Heir of Divine Things, 227-229.
26. on the Unohangeableness of God, a-9.

26. On the Creation, 46.
27. On the Cherubim, 85-86.
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that greatest of' houses or cities, this universe.
We shall see that its cause 1s God, by whom it has
come into being, 1 ts material the tour elements,
from which it was compounded, its instrument the
word of' God, through which it was framed, and the
final cause of the building is the goodness of the
architect. It is thus that truth-lovers distinguish,
who desire true and sound knowledge."~'
God, according to Philo, created the world because He is
good and kind, and for the same reason He exercises providence
over the world.

Using the analogy of the provisions that

parents make for their children, Philo describes God as dealing
bountifully with His creatures!' His blessings are showered
down upon both the good and the evil.

In tact, so numerous

are the blessings flowing from God's goodness that the world
cannot contain them.

Not only are His punishments intolerable,

but even His blessings are so abundant th.at not even the whole
world could hold them, should God wish to manifest all of them.
For that reason, He says, the Israelites said to Moses, "Speak
thou w1 th us, and we will hear; but let not God speak w1 th us,
lest we die."3° His conclusion is that the status of the
universe is measured in direct proportion to God's bestowing
or withholding His blessings.3/
But if God is so good in exercising divine providence,
how do we account for the evil in the world?

How is it possible

that evil should even exist in a world that owes its creation
28. on the Cherubim, 125-127. Here Philo shows his
acquaintance with Aristotelian causality.
29. Cf. On the Creation, 171-172.
50. Exodus 20, 19.
31. On Dreams, 143-
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and providence to the goodness ot God?
pestilence, and calamities of all kinds?

Why is there pain,
Furthermore, why

is it that these misfortunes appear to be unequally
distributed, those who deserve them often escaping them and
the righteous ones often having more than their share? These
questions are answered in Philo's two treatises On Providence,
in which he pursues philosophical arguments and does not
attempt to answer such questions on the basis of Scr~pture
and exegetical wri ting. 32. As to the .cause or evil, Philo is
convinced that God has nothing to do with it.

He uses numerous

human analogies to show that evil is something which exists
outside of God and cannot be attributed to Him, for a transcendent, perfect, beneficent God cannot be mentioned 1n the
same breath with evil.
And yet by philosophic argument he tries to show that all
evil is not unnecessary.

On the principle that some evil is

required to insure the harmon1ou~ functioning of the entire
cosmos, he offers many illustrations in which evil is at once
a misfortune for some and a blessing for others.

Thus, the

principle of God's goodness is not violated or contradicted,
but His ways are justified.

Incidentally, this very point

gives us a good insight into Philo's eclectic tendencies.
Unable to solve the mysteries of God's hidden ways from the
writings of Judaism, he turns to philosophic speculation~ All
this is quite consistent with his attempt to harmonize Jewish
theology and Greek philosophy.
32. Cf. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 58.
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This, 1n broad outline, 1s Philo's conception of God.
Throughout, he has in mind a God who is transcendent above
everything in the universe.
or apprehend Him.
finite.

Nothing finite can describe Him

The Infinite i s simply too far above the

In this respect Philo's conception is Jewish.

But

he was also impressed by the apparent connection between God
and the world.

The universe seemed to hinge on the presence

of a divine power working in .it.
seemed to shout this to him.
with the world.

All the phenome~a of nature

God must in some way be connected

Yet transcendence and immanence are terms

which defy human reconciliation.
realized the difficulty.

Undoubtedly, Philo must have

Accordingly, to supply the rational

need for an intermediate link, Philo introduced his doctrine
of the Logos.

The. Logos was the instrument through which God

descended to man and through which man ascended to God.

It is

the fundamental doctrine of Philo's system, not only because
for him it solved a great difficulty, but also because it
commended Jewish mon0theis.m to the Greeks.

··,

- 36 -

III

Doctrine ot the Logos
The doctrine of the Logos reached 1ts fullest development in Philo.. To be sur.e, this endeavor to bridge the chasm
between God and the world was not original with Philo.

As

long as the world has existed, man has been concerned about
his relations to God and about God's mode of dealing with
mankind.

This innate feeling of dependence upon the supreme

Being and a conscious speculation about His activity in the
world has been a matter of supreme i mportance to every
thoughtful human being.

Nor was the formal doctrine of the

Logos an original concept with Philo.

It is true, no one

before Philo had discussed it so thoroughly nor had attached
so much importance to it, but the idea itself, including the
very name, had already had an historical development before
Philo appeared on the scene.

The roots of this concept had

been planted centuries before, so that the idea had already
attained formidable proportions by the time Philo began to
nourish it.

In his hands it developed and matured and reached

its highest growth.

It remained for Christianity to reveal

the full, supreme significance of the Logos.
These Logos roots, planted already five centuries before
Philo's time were embedded in Greek soil.

Greek thinkers

cultivated them and gradually the Logos flower began to emerge.
Thus, by the time Philo appsared, he took up a concept that
was not original with him, but whose terminology and
,·

philosophical form had long been influenced by Greek thought.
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Philo, however, succeeded in bringing out more of its color
by shedding a religious light upon it.
Greeks had been thoroughly pagan.

The Logos of the

Although by no means

bringing out the t~ue meaning of the Logos, as John in his
Gospel has done, Philo re-interpreted this pagan, philosophical .
Logos of the Greeks by attaching . a religious significance to
it.

Through the ingenuity of Philo, the Greek Logos was

united with Hebrew monotheism.

Again, we are face to face

with the motivating purpose in Philo's mind.

His object was,

not to introduce a new system, but to effect a union bet~een
two existing systems -- Greek philosophy and Jewish theology,
He apparently made _no conscious attempt to be original.
the contrary, he was an eclectic.

On

His theology was Jewish,

his philosophy a mere reproduction of what he considered best
for his purpose from various existing systems.

Thus, to

appreciate his own concept, it will be instructive to review
briefly certain phases of Greek philosophy which Philo found
useful in establishing his Logos doctrine.

It will be well

also to keep in mind that we are now dealing with the
philosophical Logos.

Strictly speaking, there is no evolution

of the Logos idea as we Christians know and believe it,

When

John speaks of the Logos as the Son or God made incarnate, he
is speaking of a divine revelation, which is far removed from
the philosophical Logos idea.

And so, when we speak of the

development or of the primitive traces or a Logos concept, it
is the development of the philosophical Logos or ot the use
of the term, to which we are referring.

This, indeed, had a

,,.
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development.
Heraclitus, the Ephesian, who flourished about 500

B.o.,

was one of the first to introduce a more or less formal Logos
doctrine.

He was, by and large, a pantheist, and we are not

surprised that the first traces of the Logos assumed the
nature of a cosmical power.

This philosopher's premise is

that all things are in a state of constant flow and change,
s ·o that not a single object is the same for two successive
moments.I By logical deduction he arrived at the conclusion
that fire must be the primitive substance, because fire is the
most changeable of all the elements.
from fire.

All things are derived

Fire changes into water, and of water half changes

in to earth, while the other half returns to the original
substance, fire,

Thus, all the elements are in a constant

sta te of change.
However, all this change in the universe proceeds according
to a fixed law, which is none other than cosmical reason or the
Logos.

All things happen according to this Logos.

Whether

Heraclitus ascribed a conscious intelligence to the universe
is a matter of conjecture.

He seems to recognize an immanent

reason in the world, but we cannpt prove that the Logos of
Heraclitus had a conscious intelligence.~ Apparently, he
recognizes only a rational law pervading the universe.

In another sense, the Logos is really fire spiritualized,
while the material element is fire itself.

Now, of the substance

1. Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, P• 46
2. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. I, P• 39.
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of this Logos, this sp1r1tual1zed fire, the human soul is · a
portion.3 The soul is not separated in each 1nd1vj.dual 11f'e,
but is in a state of change like everything else.

Actually

the soul is material., tor 1t consists of fire, being of the
same nature as the universal principle.

Heraclitus calls 1t

an "exhalation" of the universal principle, the fire which
ascends upwards out of the moist elements of the world. Here
his pantheism is evident.

Heraclitus compared the Logos in

the universe to human reason in the individual.

In the former

1 t was objective., u~conscious reason, in the latter, subjective,

conscious intelligence.
terms

,..

Thus, says Drummond, he avoided the

I

yov5 and tpeYJv because they implied subjectiv.e kno·jlledge,

while in the Logos, this idea is not necessarily included.~
It is also apparent that with Heraclitus the Logos has
no relation to the "Word".

His is a materialistic Logos, a

cosmical power, so that there is no transcendent God whose
word it could be.

It is the universal reason in opposition to

the individual thought, "the rational self-evolution or the
world."s The relation is rather that of the whole to the parts,
since the parts are manifestations of the whole (the Logos).
This, then, is one of the earliest and one of the more
prominent usages of the Logos concept.

In his speculations,

Heraclitus arrived at a cosmical power in the universe
analagous to human reason in the individual and this rational
3. Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, P• 47
4. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. I., P• 47.
5. Ibid, P• 46.
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law he termed Logos.

Thus, Heraclitus is credited with

giving the first important impulse to this concept, which
was gradually to be taken up and developed further by those
who succeeded him.
The first to make an advance in this newly found Logos
concept was Anaxagoras, who was born about 500 B.C.

He also

claimed a primitive substance e~isted, but unlike his
predecessors, he said it was unlimited in quality and number.
To show how this unlimited primitive substance· got into motion
and order, Anaxagoras
formed his doctrine
of the "mind".
. ..
..

He

uses the word' '- ~OVf(mind) instead of >i.4{05 (reason).' "Mind"
was separated from · a11 other substance and ruled over all
things, yet it is not clear whether it is immaterial or material.
Since it brought everything into orderly arrangement, it also
possessed univers~l knowledge.

However, Anaxagoras never

attributed personal existence to mind.

It was in some things

but not in all things; it is a substance present in larger or
smaller quantities in various objects.
Anaxagoras' principal object was to explain the Jl!lterial
world, and the idea of "mind" was introduced rather as a convenience.

He was ooncerned chiefly with material phenomena,

and his only purpose in using the doctrine or mind ( vov5) was

to explain the original motion of the primitive substance,
which then spread in wider circles.

This gave rise to a force

which, under mechanical laws, separated the universe into ether
and air.

By collection or separation these formed the water,

6. Ibid, P• 48.
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earth, stones, and, finally, the sun and stars.

Since mind

is divisible and exists in smaller or larger proportions 1n
various objects, it also exists in all living things.

It is

virtually identified with the soul or the vital principle.
This pantheism reaches its extreme when Anaxagoras says that
even the plants have their share of mind.

Evidently, the

human soul was a par·t of, and of the same substance as, the
universal mind.

Whether it retained its individual being

when separated from the body• or was reabsorbed in the
cosmical mind, is not determined.
Thus, by the .introduction of the term "mind", the Logos
doctrine was advanced to a certain degree.

Under Anaxagoras

it still had all the characteristics of a vague, cosmical
f'oroe in the universe, yet by ascribing universal knowledge
to "mind", a distinct advance was made from the Logos of
Heraclitus, which did not have this attribute, but was rather
a mere rational law.
At this point we might mention in passing the name ot
Socrates.

His system contains no doctrine of the Logos, but

it does contain some things that are related to it.

Having

conceived of teleology, or design and purpose in the universe,
Socrates dwells on the personal relations between the divine
and the human.

He believed in the personality of one supreme

and universal God, under whom there were also a number of
interior and looal subordinate deities, but he also believed
that tbe universal mind could become divisible and could
separate into individual human souls, all the while retaining
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all the qualities of mind.

Thus, the human soul partakes

of the divine substance and is capable or knowing God or the
gods.

This was Socrates' chief . mode of approach to the divine.

As tar as the Logos doctrine is concerned, S.o ~rates added
nothing new .. yet his attempt to bring the human and the divine
into relation with each other has some signiticanoe, tor it
showed that Greek philosophy was beginning to consider spiritual
things in addition to material phenomena.
The next Greek philosopher with whom we have to do deserves
more than passing interest in this present discussion.
to Plato.

We refer

His philosophy actually contains ·no doctrine of the

Logos, yet some ot his doctrines have contributed to the
Alexandrian conception of the Logos.
The basis of the Platonic system is the doctrine of "ideas",7
and a knowledge of this doctrine is .essential to the understanding of Philo.

According to Plato, "ideas" are eternal,

unchangeable realities, constituting the world of real existence,
apprehended only by the reason ( vov5 }•

In the world of senses

there 1s no real being, only shifting phenomena.

Real knowledge

can be found only by arriving at general notions, which are
reality.

Thus, each visible object is merely an imperfect

pattern of the gene~al idea.

The ideas are not subject to space.

Yet they are neither divine thoughts, but real substances. Plato
believed that these ideas existed in indefinite multitude,
because there is an idea corresponding to every general notion
that we are capable of forming.

?.

ct.

He also speaks of a hierarchy

Zeller, outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy,
PP• 129ft.

·
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Of ideas, of which the highest is that of good (
~(I

to~~ ).

8

i ~ov ;,r~Bov

The latter he sometimes identifies with God, so

that "the good" is "the creator and Father of the universe."

In the relation of the eternal to the phenomenal, Plato
approaches most nearly to the doctrine ot the· Logos.

The

basis for the creation or the cosmos is the goodness of the

creator, who wished everything else to be good. 9 Now, since
nothing is good without mind, and since mind cannot be
separated from soul, the ·oreator placed mind in the soul and
soul in the body.

This is his doctrine of the cosmical soul.

The cosmos was due to the forethought of God, and apparently
was also a living being endowed with soul and mind.

Since the

universe was a living being, penetrated in all its parts with

a rational soul, this soul was the mediating term between the
ideal and the material, the eternal and the phenomenal.

Like

the ideas, it was incorporeal, like material. objects it had
come into being.

It existed in space and was cape ble of motion.

The cosmical soul was the regulating and harmonizing principle
in the world.

Again, we have the relation between the microcosm

and the macrocosm, for according to Plato, just as our bodies
were fashioned after the great body of the universe, so the
individual soul proceeded from the world's more perfect soul.
The souls were of the same material as the soul of the universe,

only with diminished purity.

Divine in origin and nature, pre-

ex istent and immortal, the soul formed the link between the

a.

Drwnmond, op. oit., Vol. I, P• 59.
9. Note the resemblance between Philo and Plato on this
point (ot. p. 33).
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ideal and the phenomenal worlds.
This gives us a sketchy background for Plato's toreshadoWing the ~ogoa doctrine.
recognized the pr~sence
universe.

or

Using the term "mind", he

an all-pervading reason in the

Moreover·, in order to bridge the chasm between

God and the world, he introduced his theory of the cosmical
soul.

This universal soul, different trom, · yet related to,

the supreme God, was the connecting link between the eternal
and the phenomenal world, and it is very similar to the later
Alexandrian philosophy of the Logos.

Like the philosophical

Logos, the soul is present everywhere in IBture, yet with
Plato "the soul is far more exclusively connected with the
material universe than is the Logos of Philo." 10 It will later
become apparent that Plato and Philo agree in many things.
Philo was indebted to Plato in a great measure both as to
thought and terminology.

Had Philo been a Greek and not a

Jew, he might have been Plato's successor.
Yet of all the schools of Greek thought, the Stoics mast
fully developed a doctrine ot the Logos.

They were not so

much interested in speculation about the mysteries ot nature,
but were more concerned with practical, religious questions.
The most eminent Stoic, perhaps, was Chrysippus, but only
fragments of his writings remain, so that we are indebted to
the later Stoic writers for our knowledge of this system.
The fundamentals ot Stoic thought are materialism and
pantheism.

Their celebrated teaching that man should live in

10. ·Drummond, op. cit., Vol. I, P• 68.

.....
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conformity with nature is well known.

Yet their doctrine ot

the -Logos is significant for its contribution to Alexandrian
theology.

The Stoics by various ph1losophioal arguments

concluded that there was reason or wisdom in the universe.
All the orderly movements and the unchangeable constancy in
the universe proved a controlling reason.

Indeed, the universe·

itself, they believed, produces this, .and, hence, they
identified the universe with God.

For the Stoics such terms

as the universe, divine reason, supreme oaus·e or Logos were
all synonymous.

Divine reason or the Logos is not detached

from, but is the.. universe its elf.

Their materialism becomes

apparent when they thus leave no further room for a higher
power transcending the material world.

With them the ultimate

is material causality, and the obvious conclusion is that God
is a material substance and the Logos a corporeal spirit."
Following Heraclitus, they attach great importance to fire.
God or Iliture was fire, and all other elements resulted by
chemical change from fire.

Thus, we arrive at a sort of

tire-Logos, a mixture of physical and religious speculation.
But the stoics seem to devi a te somewhat from this principle
when they speak of God also as a spirit.

Air or breath was

coordinate with fire, and both had pervading tendencies.
is said to permeate all things.

Air

Since these terms were

applied to God or the Logos who pervaded and permeated matter,
including "ditches and worms and workers of 1ntamy" :.2. we are
11. Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, p.215
12. Quoted in Drummond, op. oit., Vol. I, P• 87 .

.
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confronted with an all-pervading Logos, which controls the
administration of the universe.

Accordins to its various

functions in the .economy or the world, it is variously called
Destiny, Truth, Fat.e , Cause, Nature, Providence, Universe,
.....

Necessity, eto • . There is nothing better than the universe,
hence, it had reason and was God.

In another respect God is

nature, since, the Stoics believed, creation and providence
are due to nature.

Furthermore, since everything is supposed

to happen according to destiny or natural causation, God is
spoken of as destiny.

And so on.

The result is that "at every

turn we are brought back to the all-penetrating Logos" •13 Being
extreme moralists, the Stoics also found the cause for both
good and evil to reaide in nature or the universe or the Logos,
etc.
But there is another aspect of the Stoical Logos besides
1 ·ts all-pervading, materialistic and pantheistic aspect, and
I

I

that is the doctrine of the ''seminal Logos" (Ao0 05 <rTTl€p."-'CLl<o5).
It is really a theory of evolution.

The universe is regarded

as an organism which unfolded from a seed, in which all earthly
and heavenly things were wrapped up and were produced at
determined times.

Th.i s does not contradict the other explanation

of causality, for the primeval .fire was regarded es the seed.
Since the tire is both reason (as explained above) and seed 1 we
have the combined expression -- seminal reason.

This seminal

Logos is God Himself, the organic principle of the universe. At
this point we are introduced to the logoi, a term and a concept
13. Drummond, op • .cit., Vol. I, p. 94.
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which Philo adopts literally.

Just as the universe evolved

from the seminal Logos, so the various organic bodies within
the cosmos also had their seminal logo1, which were included
within the Logos

or

the universe, and as a totality either

proceeded from, o-r · merged into, the universal Logos.

Thus,

the pristine tire, like a seed, contained the logoi and causes
of all things; ·pa~t, present, and future, the latter being
united in the universal Logos.
the souls

or

In to this ·seminal Logos return

the dead.

As far as the relation of the Logos to the human soul is
concerned, the Stoics taught that man is a portion of the
universal reason, which, having become detached from itself,
constitutes man's personality.

In other words, the soul, mind,

or reason was God, dwelling as a guest within the human body.'~
Thus, both God and man participated 1n the Logos.

Without

pausing to follow their reasoning, we shall proceed to the
division of the soul in man, and notice that the Stoics separated
the soul into eight parts

the rational or intellectual

faculty, the faculties of speech and reproduction, and the five
senses.

or

these, speech appeared to be in closest connection

with the rational faculty, sinoe the voice converts the thoughts
of the soul into sound.

Thus, the so-called two-fold Logos in
I

~

f

man originated -- th$ internal Logos (AO/o> ~vo,v.8er:o; ) and the
I

I

uttered Logos ( >.. o0 oJ · Tr&oyoe 1.1<0 5 ) •

The latter is the

correlative of the internal Logos/!"

14. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. I, P• 108.
15. Ibid, Vol. I, P• 110 .•
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These are the more obvious oontributions of' the Stoical
Logos to Alexandrian theology.

It was a Logqs· that manifested

itself under various aspeots, many of them ·contradiotory and
unreal, all purely philosophical and materialistic.

Indeed,'

the whole development of the Logos concept in the hands of'
Greek philosophy is pagan.

Their problem was to bring the

human into relation with the divine, a problem which human
speculation can never solve.

Since, therefore, their approach

to the problem was materialistic, a materialistic and unsatisfactory solution was inevitable.
solve the mystery.

Only divine revelation could

This was f~;iisrm.ess to the Greeks.

In developing his Logos doctrine, Philo was influenced
large:!..y

}Jy

this a.reek speculation.

This is not surprising, if

we keep in mind his purpose of harmonizing Jewish and Greek
thought.

But Phtlo also was influenced by Judaism.

He was an

orthodox Jew, and had all the ba~kground of the Old Testament.
Thus, the Old Testament, too, contributed to the
formulation of the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy of which
Philo was the most distinguished exponent.

In the Old Testament

we find certain root~ of the Logos concept.

There are various

terms and concepts in the Old Testament which anticipate the
Logos of later times.

The Jews of Old Testament times were

'

characterized by their strict monotheism.
true God.

Jehovah was the only

Most important of all, he was transcendent.

Yet

equally fundamental was the Old Testament truth that God speaks
to the human soul and projects Himself' into the affairs of'
nature and men.

In Alexandrian philosophy we are aware of a
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philosophical explanation ot these two opposing thoughts~God's transcendence and His immanence.

Jew1sh philosophers

attempted to reconcile the two by introducing mediating
powers.

But in the Old Testament the Jewish religionist

rested on his fait·h in Jehovah and sought not so much a
theory of God's relations to nature, but tried to explain
the manner in which God takes ·part in the affairs ot men.
These descriptions contributed to the later doctrine of the
Logos in Philo, tor, as we have already remarked, Philo
approached his task with pre-conceived notions, which were
the re~ult of his Jewish faith.
In viewing the concepts under which God is represented
as active in the world we must keep in mind that there is in
the Old Testament much poetical personification.

Wisdom, for

instance, is one of the terms used to denote God's active
agency in the world, as is also the "Word".'' The latter term
contributed much to later Alexandrian theology.
translation uses the word A0/DJ.
'

The LXX

Apparently the ideas of

Spirit, Breath and Word are closely related, and it may be
that the Jew conceived of the latter as "the articulate shape
or expression of the :tormer".17 They are not God Himself, but
powers which He sends forth.

With Him, to speak is to create. 18

Here we have a theory of God's relation to the universe and
of the manner in which He communicates with it, although it

l6. ct. Isaiah 2,1; Ps. 33,6; 147,18; 148,8; c:r. also
Genesis 1 1 "And God said."
17. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. I, P• 137.
18. Ct. Ps. 33, 9.
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cannot be shown that the idea of mediation is implied.
But the "Word of the Lord" was not only an agency
employed in creation.

It also became a name tor the

revelation of Jehovah in the hearts of men: 9 Numerous
passages show that · the "Word" was regarded 1n this sense •..;1.0
Now, while it is significant that the finite and the
infinite are united with each other by 100ana of the " Word",

tl1e latter expression is probably related to Alexandrian
theology more closely in language than

tn thought. We

cannot prove from the passages cited that the "Word" 1s a
distinct hypostasis, and in this respect it differs from
the later idea of the Logos.
Yet when ue introduce the concept of Wisdom into the
discussion, a new light is cast.

The " Word" suggests,

primarily, the power or God in creation and in providence.
But we take a step farther, when we notice that g>odness,
intelligence, mercy and understanding are other aspects of
His relations with men.

All these qualities meet in the

attribute of Wisdom!' According to Jenish interpretation,
Wisdom appears to become "an agent of God in the accomplishment of His gracious wi 11 and purpose. tt.?~ In the book of
Proverbs, Wisdom 1~ personified, and some of the leading
19. George Stevens, The Theology of the New Testament, p.577
20. er. I Sam. 3,21; Is. 2,1; Ezek. 3,16; 6,1; Jer. 1,2; etc.
In all these passages the LXX has
21. Cf. Ps. 147;5; 145,9; 104,24.
22. Stevens, op. cit., P• 577.
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ideas of the doctrine of the Logos are apparent:1 3 On the
one hand, Wisdom denotes all that is good in God, on the
other, Wisdom may be apprehended by men.

In the book of

Job, too, Wisdom, while not pers~n1f1ed, is described as
a distinct entity that is apprehended by men.-~

In general, however, these expressions are poetical
personifications which describe God's activities of power
and grace in the world.

They do not indicate that the

writers looked ~pon Wisdom as a distinct being paasessing
divine attributes.

The absence of personification in Job

seems to prove this.

Yet here was an important truth in

Jewish faith, for Wisdom was the principle of unity in God
and man.

This apparently satisfied the Jewish soul.

However, not only did the Old Testament provide elements
useful in formulating the later doctrine of the Logos.

The

Old Testament apocryphal and pseudepigraphical writings also
made definite contributions along the same lines.

Traces ot

Ph1lo's Logos can be found in these extra-canonical writings.

In the Wisdom of Solomon, for example, we have the origin and
nature of wisdom desor1bedff Wisdom is God's assistant, sent
out to do His bidding,

She shares in the divine counsels

because of her intimate association with God •..:l'° In other words,
Wisdom is an "instrumental agency".

This, we shall see later,

23. er. Proverbs 3,13-26; 4,5-13; 7,4; 8,1-9,12.
24. Cf. Job 28, 12ff.
25. er. ch. 1,10; 7,22-24; 7,25-29.
26. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. I, P• 220.
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is in perfect ~greement with Philo's view that Wisdom,
or the Logos, is an emanation of the divine essence, and
plays a great part in directing the affairs of man. Whether
it is only an attribute of God or is an independent being
is not always clear.
tor Philo's Logos.

At any rate, this prepared the way
With Philo, the Logos is not that which

is spoken (he avoids the term "uttered Logos"), but it is
consistently an expressi9n of reason, so that the conceptions
associated with Wisdom are characteristic of the Logos, and
the two are virtually identified.

In Eoclesiastious, too,

we find Wisdom more or less personified.
spoken of' as "the first creation of God."

It is, for example,
J-

7

In the Targums a similar signifioation is found in the
use of the term "Memra".

The reference is to the creative

power evident in God's speaking ( Gen •. 1).

It cannot be

determined what the precise signification of M.emra is.

Some

regard it as representing "the inmost union of purpose and
will, and [as providing] a mode in which God could communicate
Himself to His people, and at the same time sustain the
universe" f' while others look upon it as "a kind of inte~
mediate agent between the transcendent Deity and the world."~'
Especially the anthropomorphic acts of God were as:ribed to
the Memra, through whom Jehovah expresses Himself' and executes
His will.
27. Cf. Oh. 1,4.10; 24,3-12; 24,32-33.
28. Joseph Carpenter, The Johannine Writings, p. 292.
29. Stevens, op. cit., P• 579.

I
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This, then, is how the Logos doctrine developed within
Judaism.

It was the Jewish solution to the problem ot God's

activity in the world.

Mediating powers were ascribed to

the Word and to ~1sdom, and their activity was the Jewish
answer to the problem of how an infinite, transcendent God
could be active in the finite world.
It is obvious that the conception of mediating powers
had taken a strong hold on the minds of men in one torm or
another centuries before ·Philo addressed himself to the
problem.

The Greeks, with a view to explaining the relation

of the Supreme Being, particularly, to nature, had arrived
a t a metaphysical principle, which, because ot its own orderly
activity and an apparent predetermined purpose motivating that
activity, and, further, because reason and intelligence were
I

1ts chief attributes, was ref'erred to as the J\a0o;.

Judaism,

on the other hand, approaching the problem from a spiritual

angle, by which it sought on the basis of faith to explain the
communion ·b etween God and man, found the answer in Wisdom or
in the word of God, the uttered Logos.
streams of thought merge.

In philo these two

Religion and philosophy are combined,

as much as a combination is possible, and a harmony ot the two
is attempted, which, however, is as unreal as it wa s sincere.
All these preliminary speculations and interpretations on
the part of Greeks and Jews establish the fact that the Logos
concept occupied. much of the· thought of m.a n~ind already betore
Philo,

80

that th1S Jewish philosopher was by no means original

in this respect,

~et he deserves a place in the history ot
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philosophy and rel1_g 1ous thought, because, by combining
two systems, he gave a new interpretation to the Logos
doctrine.

In Philo we find the culmination of that

combination or Judaism and Hellenism.

He brought the

Logos doctrine to its highest development, that is, before
Christianity revealed its true significance and obviated
any further speculation. ,
Perhaps, the most direct approach to Ph1lo's doctrine
of the Logos would be to consider his theory of the divine
powers, or logoi, which form a large part or Philo's system.
Immediately we are confronted by many difficulties.

Philo

himself admit~ that hwnan language about God is inadequate,
and that figurative language must be employed.3 ° Fur therm.ore,

Philo's style of writing is rhetorical, and this often
obscures his meaning.

Jldd to this his allego.rical inter-

pretation, and we see how extremely difficult it becomes to
fathom his meaning or to establish definitely his position.

Or, we may see the difficulty by again referring to Philo's
task.

The attempt to harmonize two opposing systems of

thought -- the teachings of Moses and the speculations of
Greek metaphysics - necessarily led to many confusions or
language.
Philo's theory of creation manifests a dualism or God
and the world!' Since, according to Philo, God formed the
world out of pre-existing, shapeless matter, matter must be
30. See P• 16.
31. er. his trea tise On the Creation
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a second principle alongside ot; although infinitely
inferior to, God.

Now, ~n order to· explain the activity

of God upon matter, Philo ·was led by sheer necessity to
introduce his doctrine of the 'divine powers' (Jvv~~(J).
The d1fficul t .y into which he was placed, .a a a result, will

be seen presently.
From the contemplation ofnature itself the human soul
begins to inquire into the nature of cosmical forces, and
soon perceives that there is some divine power or force
regulating the wbrld!i God is the Creator of the universe,
and these forces belonging to Him bring Him into immediate
connection with the world.

They are "unifying_powers", 33

because they bind and hold together all the parts of the
universe, and prevent the universe from being dissolved into
its parts.

Both in the spheres

or

mind and of matter we are

confronted by these powers, which give form and reality to
the objects of nature.

All these powers are efficient through

God, who 1s the ultimate causality.

Whenever we see two or

more objects that can be distinguished, we are aware of the
presence of powers, for it is the function of these powers to
differentiate between the objects in the universe.

·In his own

words we are told:
"Again the torches of fire borne as in the mys t1o
torch-rite are the judgments of God the torchbearer, judgments bright and radiant, whose wont it
is to range between the half-pieces, that is between
the opposites of which the whole world is composed.
For we read 'torches ot fire which passed through
32. Cf. P• 23.

33. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 69.
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between the half'~pieoes •3"' Thus you may know how
highly,exoellent is the work or the Potencies
[6'11v"Y"c!wvJ of God as they pass through the midst
or material and immaterial things. They destroy
nothing - for the halt-p1eces remain unharmed - 3
but divide and distinguish the natur~ of eaoh." ~

Everything that· we see in nat~re had an immaterial or
ideal pattern, so that these powers or forces themselves are
immaterial ( Q. <r ~,µ.Cl( , ct). J<o
Moreover, these divine powers are said to be eternal,
because they are connected with the eternal mind of God.
Through their energy the ideal world was formed into the
material, the intelligtble into the perceptible.
is the archetype of the latter.

are the powers themselves.

The former

The world or ideas, then,

Through them God became a.c tive 1n

the universe.
The question now arises, Is there not some orderly
arrangement to these innumerable powers?

It is to be expected

that some would take precedence over others, or that some
would be dependent upon others.

From a passage, in which

Philo gives an allegorical interpretation of the cherubim
placed at the gates of Paradise, we gain a clearer view of
these powers.
"The voice told me that while God is indeed one, His
highest and chiefest powers are two, even goodness
and sovereignty. Through His goodness He begat all
that is, through His sovereignty He rules what He
has begotten. And in the midst between the two
there is a third which unites them, Reason, for it

34. Cf. Gen. 15, 17.
35. Who is the· Heir of Divine Things, 311-312.
36. ct- On the Life of Moses, II, 74.

- 57 -

is through reason that God is . both ruler and good.
Of these two potencies sovereignty and goodness
the Cherubim are symbols, as the fiery sword 1s
the ~ymbol of reason. For exceeding swift and
b~rning heat is reason and chiefly so the reason
of the ( Great) Cause, tor it alone prece·d ed and
outran all things, conceived before them all,
manifest above them all." J7
The two main powers - goodness and sovereignty - unite
all the other powers, end these two in turn are united by the
Logos.

Using terms which are common in the LXX, Philo
I

.

represents goodness as fJio; and sovereignty as

I
xve,o>.

From

these passages it is evident that Philo conceived of the
goodness and the sovereignty of God as powers which were
.

.

highest in the hierarchy, under which the whole multitude of
other powers can be classed.

This would appear to be a neatly

worked out system, if, as we have seen, the powers exercised
their function according to a hierarchy, each in its own sphere.
But such is not the case.

These powers do not merely stand

beside each other, but they also appear in each other.
partakes of some of the attributes of another.

One

This obsoures

Philo's orderly arrangement of the powers, assuming that an
orderly arrangement was intended at all.
As to the preeise relation of these pONere to God, no one

seems to know just what Philo believed.

He himself was aware

of the difficulty and, therefore, reoommended that this
particular study be attempted by those only who were sufficiently
trained.

It has been observed, however, that Philo is here

involved in a dilemma.

Two influenoes cross - the religious

37. On the Cherubim, 27-28.

.. 58 -

personal beings and the philosophical impersonal.

Philo

himself is not clear.31 At times, the powers appear to be
attributes of God and, collectively, represent the nature
or essence of God.~, But this would not solve Philo' s problem,
for it does not answer the question how the infinite God,
trans.cending time and space, nevertheless acts upon the
world.

Certainly, Philo bel~eved that He did.

The passage

which interpreters of Philo use most frequently to prove that
he conceived of the powers as persona essentially different
from God is cited by Drummond, who quotes Philo as saying,
"[out of matter] God generated all things, not
touching it himself, for it was not right tor the
,'Jise and Blessed to come in contact with indeterminate and mixed matter; but he used the incorporeal
powers, whose real name is ideas, that the fitting
form might take possession of each genus."~0
The idea appears to be that the powers surround God and
wait upon Him in much the same manner as servants wait to do
the king's bidding.

In other instances, too, Philo creates

the impression that God is above the powers, and, hence, they
must in some measure be subordinate entities.

There seems to

be a definite dis tine tion between "God in His essential being
and God conceived under the partial aspect ot the powers."~'
The mediating aspect of these powers is introduced when
Philo speaks of God as touching all things through His powers.
The connection between the divine and the human is effected

er.

Zeller, Die PhilOSO:Qhie der Grieohen, PP• 6llf'f.
ct, On Dreamst I, 232.
40. Op. cit., Vol. II, P• 113.
41. Ibid, Vol. II, P• 121.
38.
39.
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through these mediating powers.

God cannot touch the soul

directly because He is transcendent, but He does this through
the powers.

In the human mind these powers· would appear as

thoughts, in ma~ter as ideal forms.

Inasmuch as they are

divine and yet d9 not constitute the essence of God, the
powers form the intermediate link between God and the world.
"They are the connection between the universe and God 1
mediating between them, not because they are different from
both, but because they are strictly separable from neither.
Withdraw them from the mind, and it becomes a non-entity;
withdraw them f~om the material world, and it ceases to be a
cosmos; detach .them, if that be conceivable, from God, and
they Will sinlc into nothingness.""" And so, Philo refers to
God under two aspects, God in His unknown and transcendent

essence, and G9d as He is manifested through His powers.
In Philo's doctrine of the divine powers most writers
agree that he is inconsistent and even contradictoJ;"y, and 11"
we would place opposite passages side by side, we too would
perhaps agree.

But Drummond, who appears to be Ph1lo's most

sympathetic interpreter, is not so ready to charge him with
naive contradiction.

In trying to find a reason tor the

apparent inconsistencies, he calls attention to Philo's
fondness tor personification, and he remarks that, since Philo
through.out his writings personifies virtues, attributes, the
parts of the soul:-, time, space, historical narratives, etc.,

we may regard his personification of the powers as figurative.~ 3
42. Ibid., Vol. II, P• 116.
43. Drummond, op~ cit., Vol, II, P• 123ft.

:

I
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Apparently, he is inclined to believe that Philo did not
regard the logoi us distinct personalities. -Whether Philo
uses personifications merely .in agreement with his principle
that human language is not adaptable to divine mysteries, or
whether he really believed the powere to be distinct beings,
we shall perhaps never know.

However, I believe his eclectic

and harmoniz~ng tendencies led him into a difficulty which he
hi~self did not know how to solve.

Had he not borrowed from,

and tried to harmonize, so .many diverse systems of thought,
he would have been spared some difficult problems.
In regard to .these 'divine powers or logoi, we must notice
briefly four sources from which Philo borrowed. In the first
place> he is .largely indebted to Plato, particularly, Plato's
doctrine of ideas.

The best passage, showing the resemble~~e

of Philo's powers to Plato's ideas, at least in their function
on the universe, is found in his treatise On the Creation. In
describing the manner in which God created the universe,
Philo says:
"For God, being God, assumed that a beautiful copy
would never be produced apart from a beautiful
pattern, and that no object of perception would be
faultless whioh was not made in the likeness ot an
original discerned only by the intellect. So when
He willed to create this visible world He first
fully formed the intelligible world, in order that
He might have the use of a pattern wholly God-like
and incorporeal in producing the material world,
as a later creation, the very image or an earlier,
to embrace in itself objects of perception of as
many kinds _as the other contained objects of
intelligence.
.
To speak of or conceive that world which consists
of ideas ~s being in some place is illegitimate;
how it consists (of them) we shall know it we carefully attend to some image supplied by the things
of our world. When a city is being founded to
satisfy the soaring ambition of some king or
governor, who lays claim to despotic power and
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being magnificent in his ideas would fain add a
fresh lustre to his good fortune, there comes forward
now and again some trained architect who, observing
the favourable climate and convenient position of
the site, first sketches in his own mind wellnigh
all the parts of the city that is to be wrought out,
·temples, gymnasia, town-halls, market-places,
harbours, docks, streets, walls to be built,
dwelling-houses as well as public buildings to be
set up. Thus after having received 1n his own soul,
as 1-t were in wax, the figure.a of. these objects
severally, he carries about the image of a city
which is the cre~tion of his mind. Then by his
innate ·power of memory, he recalls the images of
the various parts of this oity, and imprints their
types yet more distinctly 1n it: and like a good
craftsman he begins to build the city of stones
and timber, keeping his eye upon his pattern and
making the visible and tangible objects correspond
in each case to the corporeal ideas.
Just such must be our thoughts about God. We
must suppose that, when He was minded to found the
one great city, He conceived beforehand the model
of its parts, and that out of these He constituted
and brought to completion a world discernible only
by the mind, and then, with that for a pattern, the
world which our senses can perceive. As., then, the
city which was fashioned beforehand within the mind
of the architect held· no place in the outer world,
but had been engraved in the soul of the artificer
as by a seal; even so the universe that consisted
of ideas would have no other location than the
Divine Reason [A60 ov], which was the Author of this
ordered frame. For what other place could there be
for His powers to receive and contain, I say not
all but, any one of them whatever uncompounded and
untempered?"""'
Of course, true to his principle that all Greek philosophy
borrowed from Moses, Philo ba·ses this doctrine on passages :f'rom
the Old Testament, giving it· a Scriptural appeal.

When it is

said tha~ "God created man in His own image" ,11-s Philo understands
this to mean that man was created only like the image of God,
not like God.

In other words, man is the image of an image.

This applies also to the whole visible cosmos, each perceptible
44. On the Creation, 16-20.
45. ct. Genesis 1, 27.
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object having an archetypal idea, which is its image.

He also

refers to Gen. 2, 4f to support his theory that God first
-

created transcendental, incorporeal archetypes of all physical
and material things.

Another resemblance to Plato may by

found, when Philo de.s cribes the powers as rays

or light,

which

emanate from God and take up their residence as thoughts in
the minds of men.

This reminds us of Plato's world-soul,

reaching out and expanding in the universe, parts of which form
the minds of men.

The same approach to the communion of the

human with the divine is evident in both. We may mention here,
too, that Philo•s conception of God is similar to the Platonic
unchangeable reason ( v-ov5), al though the Logos of Philo, having
the two-fold aspect of inward, subjective and outward, objective
functions, is more active in the world,
activities are the logoi.

These outward, objective

Thus, in relation to the world,

Philo read into his doctrine of intermediate beings all the
leading thoughts of Plato's theory.
Another source which contributed to the formulation of
Philo's doctrine of divine powers is the Old Testament doctrine
of angels.

It is not clear whether Philo identified angels

~no. powers, but the resemblance between the two is evident.
Angels were God's messengers and servants; so were the powers
with Philo.

One distinction, however, may be noted.

The

angels wers created, while Philo regards the powers as eternal.
Furthermore, in passages where the person of God is referred
to in the plural (actually, the editorial plural)i' Philo
believes that this signifies the powers cooperating with God
46. E.g., Gen. 1,26; 3,22; 11,7.
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as obedient servants.

S1noe, according to Philo, these powers

also assisted 1n the oreation, they cannot be angels, tor angels
are created beings.

But whatever the relationship is between

angels and divfne powers, it is clear that elements ot the
Jewish doctrine of the angels are included in Philo's doctrine
of the divine powers.

A third source which may have influenced Philo on this
point is the Greek theory of demons.

According to the Greeks,

demons inhabited the air, that is, the space between the earth
and the heaven.

In this atmosphere they flew about, some

descending into bodies and forming the souls of men, others,
who were more pure and consecrated, remaining in the ethereal
regions for the purpose of serving the Father of the universe.~ 7
This strongly resembles Philo's divine powers, which are also
a host of beings separated from ·God, but mysteriously related

to Him.
Finally, Philo was strongly influenced by the stoics,
especially the Stoio >io'6 o; cnree,µ.c1.r:L1<65, or ao tive cause,
which all phenomena in the universe are the result.

or

As tar

as the powers ~re concerned, they closely resemble the doctrine
of emanations which was peculiar to the Stoics.

Philo, as we·

have already seen, describes the powers as parts of the Godhead
that expand or radiate in the universe.

This is the same

function ascribed to the stoic emanations.

Both proceed from

the Deity and beoome the cause of all things.

It has been

suggested that this Stoic doctrine influenced Philo most, s1n~e,
47.

er.

Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 144 •
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on the one hand. ange~s and demons were a bit too personal
for his system.., while. on the other, the Platonic ideas were
too abstract. being only archetypes and not moving powers."'
In general, however, we may say that the divine powers ot Philo
were somewhere between Stoic emanations and Platonic ideas.
Viewed on their immaterial side, they were divine thouf9).ts;
in their cosmic aspe,ct they were motivating or efficient
causes."'"
The reason tor our concern about the sources from which
Philo borrowed this doctrine is to be found, first, in the
importance which he attaches to these powers and, second, in
the fact that Philo's doctrine was not original.

CQncerning

the former, ·to understand something of Philo is to gain a

general conception of what the powers or logoi are in his

system. As Drummond remarks, nwe mee.t these powers everywhere,
tor they alone give reality and meaning to all to all that we
see and touch.

They are the secret beauty in each humblest

thing; they are the mighty bonds which constrain earth and
ocean and sky into the harmony of a cosmos; and since they
are but the varied expression of the divine energy, it is
through them tha·t the universe lies unt'olded in the allpervading immens1 ty of God. "so Nor could we understand the
Logos eoncept of Philo without inquiring into the significance
and function of the ·,powers', for the latter are 1~t1mately
connected with the former.
48. ct. Zeller, Die Fhilosophie der Grieohen, PP• ol5tt.
49. Carpenter, op. cit., P• 299.
50. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 155.
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As a matter ot fact, all the powers "proceed from, are
reconciled by, and are merged in the Logos - the cornerstone
of Philo's system.n Philo, apparently, was unable to clearly

define the powers, nor was he able to harmonize all of them,
yet they are all comprehended in the one Logos, which is the
most universal intermediary between God and the world.
As we approach the Logos doctrine itself, one of our
first impressions is the many aspects under which Philo's
Logos can be viewed.

Drummond speaks of an enormous 11st

of cla.ss.1 ficat1ons made by Grossmann, in which the latter
lists the many me~ni~gs of the Logos.

Consequently, it is

rather futile to search for a single, definite notion of
Philo's Logos, for "it is the expression of God in all His
multiple .and manifold activity, the instrument of creation,
the seat of ideas, the world. of thought which God first
established as the model

or

the visible universe, the guiding

providence, the power of virtue, the fount of wisdom,
described sometimes 1n religious ecstacy, sometimes in philosophical metaphysics, sometimes in the spirit of the mystical
poet."si It is like "a crystal prisro. reflecting the light 01'
t he C'i<>dhead in a myriad different ways. nE3 In other words, it

is the complete aspect of God as He makes Himself known t.o
the world.
We have already seen in connection with the divine powers
the influence of the Jewish conceptions of Wisdom and the
51. William Fairweather, Jesus and the Greeks, P• 190.
52. Bentwich, op. cit., p, 148.
53. Ibid., P• 152.
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oreat1ve Word of God, the Platonic ideas, the Stoia emanations
and divine reason operating 1n the world.

The same influences

may be noted in Ph1lo's Logos concept, tor by oomb1n1ng all
these doctrines Philo pr?duoed a kind ot "mediatorial hypostasisn
between God and the world.

Moreover, the same d1ff1oulties

that were encountered in determining the precise neture of the
powers are to be met with in the Logos doctrine.

In this

doctrine Philo's ecleotioism is perhaps more apparent than 1n
any other of his theories, for this doctrine is the center of
his system.

This mixture of such diverse elements explains

the lack of systematic formulation.

Add to this Philo's gifts

for imagination, his arbitrary use of allegory, his utter disregard for legitimate hermeneutics, and the result is a concept
that defies understanding.
To mention a few of the innumerable aspects of the Logos,
there is, first of all, Ph1lo's conception of the Logos as
mind, the rational part

or

the human soul.

Because of its close

connection with man's reason, these two are at times identified,
and the Logo\ becomes a name for man's reason or tL~derstanding.r~

Again, the Logos may mean any abstract or impersonal expression
of human reason or character.rrln another sense, the Logos may
signify speech, which is a product

or

reason. In this sense it

applies especially to Scripture, tor, according to Philo,
scripture is not merely the means through which the Logos speaks,
but it is itself the Logos.

Thus, with Philo, the Logos does

not always denote the same thing.
54. Cf. the treatise On Abraham, 83.
55. er. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 158.
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In its connection with the powers, it will be recalled
that all the powers were comprehended in the Logos.

According

to PhilQ's cosmology, all perceptible objects are the result
of the eternal ideas, whose impress or image they bear, so

that the whole cosmos can be traced back to God's thought.
God's thought or Reason is the most generic thing, under which
the innumerable lesser thoughts or ideas are assembled and
united.

It is interesting to see how Philo tries to prove this~

He refers to the incident in the Old Testament where God
miraculously fed the children of Israel in the wilderness with
manna,s' and Philo concludes that this is symbolic of the divine
thought of God nourishing the soul.

He identities this manna

with the "word" of God and thus, as a logical consequence, with
the "Logos of God." s 7
From thi.s it is apparent that Philo regarded the Logos as
the highest of all. things that have come into being.

God stands

at the head of the hierarchy, supreme, then comes the Logos,
which is second to God.
or divine powers.
"Scriptura~ proof'' .

From the Logos proceed all the logoi

On this point, too, Philo is not without
An example of this superiority of the

Logos is based on Exodus 25,22, where the Lord speaks ot
communicating with the children of Israel "from between the
two cherubim which are upon the ark of the testimony."

From

this Ph'ilo concludes that "the Logos is the driver of the
powers but

he

who speaks is the rider, giving to the driver

56. Exodus 16, 15-16.
57. Drummond, op. 01 t., Vol. II, P• 160 • ..
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the orders which tend to the correct driving of the universe."

s-,

In brief, then, all the powers are united and summed up in the
Logos, for the Divine Thought comprehends all the divine
thoughts.

Since God is supreme, the Logos is beneath Him, is

second to Him, and is contained in Him.

This is Philo's

conception of how the transcendent God becomes, through the
agency of a hierarchy of powers, immanent in the universe.
Viewed from another angle, the Logos becomes the archetype
or seal which is stamped upon both mind and matter.

Philo

' 05) of the Maker is the seal by
says that the thought ( Ao0
which each object in the universe has been stamped and shaped.~9
According to this conception, also the species which we see
are perfect, being an impression of a perfect thought.

Thus,

we are told that "the Log.c s is the genus under which the various
ideal types that ~re observed in the universe are classed, and
that the permanence of specific forms, which till modern. times
was believed to be a fact of experience, 1s ascribed to their
participation in the uncbangeableness of creative thought."' 0
Since man is the highest creature among all the objects of
nature, he, therefore, has this divine impress in a pre-eminent
degree.

Indeed, the rational soul within man has been patterned

after the archetypal idea of the divine image and is an
impression of eternal Reason.
Philo also regarded the Logos as eternal.

In doing so,

however, he is involved in a contradiction, for if the Logos
is to be regarded as an archetypal idea, it must have had a
58. Quoted in Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 161.
59. Cf. On Creation, 25.
60. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 165.
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beginning.

On the other band, it the Logos existed in the

eternal God, as "eternal Reason" or "His eternal ·image, the
most sacred Logos", it must be without beginning.

The solution

seems to be that,. whether .it is hidden away in the divine
essence and is thus subjective, or whether it has become
objective by being imprinted on the universe, the idea is the
same.

Regarded as a law, .,·in its essence it is eternal, though

not in its applioation.

And so, when the Logos is spoken ot

as "the most generic of all the things" that have been created,
this refers only to its character of "Word",
impressed formless matter.

by

which it

In its relation to God, the Logos

is eternal; 1n its relation to man, it is the beginning ot all
things.
These are some or the more prominent aspects of the Logos
as conceived by Philo.

They by no means exhaust the concept,

but they serve to show in a general way Philo's idea of
mediation between God and the universe.

Other aspects will be

dealt with m.o re in detail as we observe the relation of the
Logos to God and to man.
We have already viewed Philo's doctrine of God.

Recalling

this to mind, we proceed to place the Logos in its relation to
the doctrine ot God.

In this respect the Logos is variously

referred to as the Reason of God, the Son of God and the image

ot God.

Here also we have the two-fold meaning - on the one

hand, it appears as an attribute of God, as identical with
divine Reason, on the other, as a aelt-suff1c1ent being, a
distinct personality.
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It is clear that Philo re@llrded the Logos as the Reason
of God.

Offhand, we might recognize in this conception an

opportunity to accuse Philo of an inconsistency, for how oan
he pretend to exp.l ain the Reason ot God when his primary
assumption 1s ·that God is incomprehensible.

He resolves the

difficulty by saying that we know God through the predicates
ascribed to Him as they are manifested in the universe."
Having already dwelt upon the divine powers, we have seen that
all these forces are merged into two chief powers - God's
goodness and His sovereignty.

These two are in turn the

products of the Logos or rational power, from which all things
have their cause.

In this respect, then, the Logos is thought

of as Reason - Reason in God and Reason in the universe.

God

Himself is not identified with Reason, tor He transcends, and
includes more than, Reason; but Reason is one of God's modes,
or one ot the manifestations or His Being.

Mankind depends

upon the Logos, this Reason, tor its own rational power, but
the transcendent God is over and above the Logos, for Reason
or Logos depends upon God for its existence.
In another respect, the Logos is spoken of as the "Son
of God."

There is, however, no similarity whatsoever between

this idea and the .Christian conception of the Son of God. With
Philo this was a mere figure of speech to denote the Logos as
a product of the Self-existent Being.

Because the Logos was

dependent upon God for existence, it is .thought of as a son,
and this "always in its cosmical relations, that is. as the
61.

er.

p. 25.
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Thought of God made objeotive in the uni verse."

,.i

Y~t the Logos was also the. archetype of the uni verse', so

that in its objective relation it became the image of God also.
In his treatise On Dreams Philo speaks of the human soul', as
well as the whole cosmos·, as having been stamped "with His

image and an ideal form, even His onn Word" ( >.0(05

):3

On the .

basis of Genesis l _,27 he infers that. both ~n and the universe,
created in the iD!,age. of God·, bear the mark of the Divine
Thought and are thus relate.d to God·.

Since man is the highe&~ .

creature in the · universe·, the human mind, t:P,at 1s·, the rational
part Qf 1 t ·,

is

a sort of oopy of the Logos.

It is not as

perfect as the Logos, nor indeed can it be, for the Logos is
the archetype of all, the image

or

God.

Here again, Philo

pretends to use scriptural proof, by referring to the words of
Joseph's brothers spoke~ to Pharaoh, "We are all sons of one
man!' ,'11 and he goes on to say that, "if we have not yet become
fit to be thought sons of God, yet we may be sons of His

invi~ible image, the most holy Word.

For the Word is the eldest-

born image of God;n<.5'Thus, all visible things in the universe
are an expression of the archetypal ideas or thoughts of God;
which are centered in the Logos, but the Logos itself is God's
image.

Here we are on the threshold of a mediating Logos. It is
the link which connects the transcendent God and the finite
62. Drummond, op. eit., Vol. II, p. 185.
63. On Dreams, II, 45.
64. Genesis 42, 11.
65. on the Confusion of Tongues, 147.
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universe.

In the mediating aspect ot Philo's Logos there is

summed up for us practically all that Philo has to say about
the absolute essence ot God as opposed to His revelation in
the world.

Through this mediating Logos Philo tries to

harmonize the transcendence and the immanence ot God.

The

Logos is, on the one hand, closely related to God, because it
comes from Him and ·depends upon Him for existence and energy.
On the other band, it is intimately conneoted with the world,
for it gives reality and activity to the visible things in the
universe.

That it occupies a middle position 18 seen from the

fact that it is neither uncreated like God, nor created like
the visible things.

Philo is aware

or

this when he says,

"To His Word, His chief messenger, highest in age
and honour, the Father of all has given the special
prerogative, to stand on the border and separate the
creature from the Creator. This same Word both
pleads with the immortal as suppliant for afflicted
mortality and acts as ambassador of the ruler to
the subject. He glories in this prerogative and
proudly describes it in these words, 'and I stood
between the Lord and you'," that is neither
uncreated as God, nor created as you, but midway
between the two extremes, a surety to both sides;
to the parent, pledging the creature that it
should never altogether rebel against the rein and
choose disorder rather than order; to the child,
warranting his hopes that the merciful God will
never forgot His own work. For I am the harbinger
of peace to creation from that God whose will is to
bring wars to an end, who is ever the guardian of
peace. "''7
There is a difficulty here, of course, in the form ot an
unreasonable statement, for our minds cannot conceive ot anything
that is at once created and uncreated.
of Ph1lo's doctrine of the Logos.

Indeed, this is the orux

Despite all his imagination,

60. Deu t. 5, 5.

67. Who is the Heir of Divine Things, 205-206.
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his ingenuity, his allegorical interpretation, this difficulty
remained unsolved.

He certainly must have recognized such a

glaring discrepancy, yet he .was unable to resolve it.

The

mediating Logos was a oonvenlent, though not always a consistent,
instrument for his system, so that the difficulties apparently
did not bother him over-much.

It was his way· of explaining·

the creative and .the regal aotlvity of God in the universe,
the harmony between .transcendence and immanence.

"The Logos,

therefore, is not a demiurge who aots fo.r or instead of God,
but it is God's own rational energy acting upon matter; and
as a material world cannot, like a human work, be finished oft
and 1.eft to itself, this energy 1s always there, and links the
cosmos to the infinite source of power and order."~e
In its relation to man th~ Logos exercises the function
of a moral law.

In its physical aspect it gives reality to all

the objects of creation and has control over all the ideal
types, so that, in reality, it is the supreme cosmical law or
power.' 9 Now, by the analogy of microcosm and macrocosm, the
·human soul also has a rational power or reason, the counterpart

ot the universal reason.

But since our own reason often errs,

we designate the universal reason as "right reason" or "the
reason of nature", since this is unchangeable and cannot err. 70
This law of nature is the Logos.

In its relation to human

beings this unchangeable cosmical law becomes a moral law, and
we readily see the resemblance to the Stoic principle, "Live

as.

Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 193.
69. Here we note the resemblance between Philo's LogQs and
that of Heraclitus (the Logos as a law ot the universe) and ot the
Stoios (the Logos as a oosmioal power).
70. ct. On Creation, 61 •
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conformably to nature."

The substance ot Philo's argument tor

this principle is found in the tollow1ng passage:
"Now since every well-ordered eta te has a
constitution, the citizen of the world enjoyed of
necessity tbe sam~ constitution as did the whole
world: and this constitution is nature's right
relation, more properly called an •ordinance',
or 'dispensation', seeing it as a divine law,
in accordance ,11 t}:l which there was duly
apportioned to all existences that rightly
falls to them severally." ,,,
Apparently, then, when one follows the law or nature,
he is following God, since "'law is nothing but divine reason
enjoining what ·is right and forbidding what is wrong', so that
in doing the law we do the Logos, and our supreme end is to
follow God." 1~
In another aspect, the Logos is the bond of the universe.
Not only has it given form and reality to the objects in the
universe, but it has distributed them in such a way that there
is order and relation among them.

It has separated all things

into genus and species, giving them order and arrangement.

In

this respect, too, it is the sum-total of all the powers, since
all the various powers which. act upon the objects of the
universe must necessarily be dependent upon the Logos, because
the Logos controls these objects.

In a passage in his t~eat1se

Ou Dreams Philo illustrates this by comparing the universe to
a temple of God, in whioh the Logos serves as a high-priest.

73

In this capacity it ministers to all the parts of the universe,
holding them together and preventing them from disintegrating
71. On Creation, 143.
72. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 167.
73.

er.

on Dreams, I, 213ff.
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into formless matter, so that the Creator brought order out
of disorder and contusion, and established the universe "upon
the mighty Word who is My viceroy." 111
A ·~hird aspect of Philo' s Logos in 1 ts relation to the
universe is this that it appears to be two-fold.

It will be

significant to recall at this point the two-fold division ot
the Sto1o Logos or cosmical power into inward and uttered Logos
(cf. p. 47).

'l'l1e Stoics applied this two-fold di vision to the

universal Logos, but whether Philo conceived of the divine
Logos as being similarly divided or whether it was two-fold
only in its relation to man is not clear.

According to Drummond,

"two facts ere equally certain, that Philo acknowledges a
distinction of some sort in the universal Logos, and that, tor
son1e reason or other, he never expresses this distinction by

the terms applied to the Logos in man." 7 s It is true, the Logos
is distinguished frora the Supreme Being in that it is ~alled
f)cdJ w1 thout the article, . or cfe~-rceos
11

a~'1j, but, says Zeller,

1,ar haben kein Recht, den Niderspruch ci1eser Ausserungen
durch
"

die Annahme eines doppelten Logos, oder einer zwe1fachen

Ex-istenzf'orm des Logos zu beseitigen, derjenigen, worin .er dem
g~ttlichen \1esen als Kraft oder Eigenschaft inwohnte, und derrt

jenigen, in welche er bei seinem selbststandigen Hervortreten
\f
:,r'e
.
aus dem gottliohen Wesen einging, des "0(05 evotd. cro; und
.

I

TT€O'fOf!. c. I( 0)

• 111'

It is said that Philo speaks not 01' a double

Logos, but of a double revelation ot the Logos.
74. On Dreams, I, 241.
75. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 171.
76. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, P• 623.
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In its simplest torm the Logos 1s the thought ot God.
Now this thought may app~ar in. two :f'orms.

First, it lies

hidden in the mind of God, and, then, 1 t is expres:Jed or made
objective in the universe.

Before creation, the intelligible

world, that is, the sum-total ot all the immaterial ideas or
archetypes, resided in the mind of God.

However, when God

spoke, the Logos was impressed upon matter, and the intelligible
cosmos beoame a perceptible oosmos.

We should not, however,

regard the '' inward Logos'' as merely God's intention to create,

or as only the initial purpose, but rather that "this inward
conception, which sprang immediately from the creative purpose
· or God, was the intelligible cosmos, and this again, as we are
expressly told, was the Logos. n77 There 1s an apparent contradiction here, since now the Logos is the thought of C-od, which
produced the ideal world, and again, it is the intelligible
world itself.
The reason for Philo's reluctance to apply the term "uttered"
to the Word of God may be found in his tendency to do a,vay with
all an thropomorph1.sms.
physical organs.

Speech implies a mouth and several other

But God cannot be said to have these physical

organs, and thus the analogy breal<:s down.

Consequently, Philo

regarded t~e Word of God as an actual work, "for God in speaking
created simultaneously, placing nothing betneen the two; - but
if one ought to set going a tru~r opinion, the word is Bis work."7 8

This two-fold aspect of the Logos Drummond has sumL'led up thus:
"the word and the deed are identical; the utterance is the
77. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 175.

78. Quoted in Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 181.
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stamping of the divine a.n d oosm1oal thought upon matter; and
the Logos, the Word, is the finished work, the Thought of God
made objective, for the sole creation and the sole reality in
this material universe is that Thought which resolves itselt
into a permeating tissue of ideas, and speaks to our reason as
an expression of the supreme Mind."

?f

We have already seen that W1sdom 80 1~ an important concept
in Philo's syste~, and we are now prepared to consider the
relation of the Logos to Wisdom.

This relationship is rather

obscure and has been interpreted variously.

Some writers have

claimed that the Logos arid Wisdom are identical, others have
distinguished the two, subordinating the latter to the former
and re~rding Wisdom as one of' the divine powers, which emanates
frem the Logos.

Whether Philo himself

\Va$

clear on this point

is uncertaint for apparently there is no oiear-cut statement in
his writings which might show his definite position.
In the first place, there are certa~n statements ·which seem
to indicate th~t the Logos and Wisdom were identified.

Philo

uses the two terms interchangeably, particularly in one instance
where he is rendering an allegorical interpre~ation of the
Garden of Eden. 81 He observes that the soul is waterd by the
Divine· Word which "descends from the fountain of Wisdom", and
again in the same treatise the Divine Word is represented as
"full of the stream of Wisdom."

In fact, the whole· passage

leaves the impression that the two terms indicate one and the
same

thing.

Secondly, Philo speaks of Wisdom in another pla~e,

79. Ibid • .
I
80. a-otpt.i:J...

81. Cf. On Dreams, II, 36ff.
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using terms and thoughts which we should expect to be used
only of the Logos.1~ In this instance he is oommenttng on
Deut. 32,13, and he seems to regard ~1sdom as the highest or
all the powers, that nhich nourishes the soul.

Now this same

pos1·t1on and function is ascribed to the Logos, so that apparently
the two terms are identified.

In another instance Wisdom seems

to be on a par with the Logos.

In connection with the fourth

co~.mandment/J Philo, again

employing allegory to its limit,

speaks of God as ·the Father of the uni verse, . and Wisdom as its

mother, the instrument through which the universe was formed • .r,,i
Again, there is a mingling of terms, for Philo assigns the
creative function, which, as we have seen, was attributed to
t he Logos, to Wisdom.

In view of all these instances, it would

seem that Philo is rather inconsistent.

Nowhere does he

absolutely identify the two terms, yet he ascribes a particular
function of the one to the other.

Now this may be due to his

special treatment of a certain passage. to a particu~ar aim
which he had in view, or to a chosen class of readers.

And so,

before we conclude that Wisdom and Logos are identical, it will
be no more than fair to note an instance 1n which the two
concepts are distinguished from one another •
.According to Drwwnond, when Wisdom is represented as the
mother of the cosmical Logos, "we may t'airly take the latter to
be the uttered ijord, the former the eternal attribute of God.n is

82. The Worse Attacks the Better, 115ff.
83. Exodus 20. 12.

84. On Drunkenness, 30ff.
85. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 210.
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Yet it is not certain that Philo was conscious ot this
difference, for he never adopted the term "uttered Word."
Still, it appears that, since Wisdom is the mother ot the
universe, and ·the Logos, as the seal ot the universe, is its
offspring, human wisdom 1s subordinate to divine Wisdom in the\
same relation as the species is to the genus.

This has led

Drummond to conclude that "the distinction in Philo's mind
was not that between the inward and the uttered, but between
the universal and the particular, and that what he meant · to
teach was that the divine principle of righteous law in each
of us was the offspring of that cosmical law which 'preserves
the s ·liars from wrong'". ''
In dealing with ~his partio~lar point, however, we are
treading on unsafe ground.

Philo is trying to work out a

rational explanation of the relation between the two concepts,
Wisdom and the Logos, yet his allegory and his inconsistencies
in language make him hard to understand.

It becomes even more

difficult to understand him, when he apparently indicates that
he himself is not clear in .his distinction.

How can we under-

stand the position of a man, when the man himself is not clear
in his thought?

Indeed, this is characteristic of Philo, so

that there 1~ really no formula which renders his position
intelligible.

In the final analysis, about all we can hope to

accomplish in a study of Ph11Q is to understand the man himself,
rather than his doctrines.

But to return to the discussion.

Taken by and large, Wisdom and ~he Logos, in their ultimate
86. Ibid.

'"""

.\\

1

\
\
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significations, seem to be identical.

It is true, there are

instances in which the two apparently occupy dirrerent positions,
especially in their relation to the cosmos.

In this objective

aspect they are occasionally distinguished.

But the over-all

impression is that there is little practical difference between
the two.
Nou, we might have ended this di~cuss.ion at this point,
assuming that it would be of little consequence to press the
point, were it not for the significance of the concept Wisdom.
Philo, too, no doubt, could have escaped his inconsistencies
and misunderstandings, had he not introduced ~isdom on so high
a plane and had dealt only with the Logos.
hov,ever, this was impossible.

To Philo, the Jew,

A Jew at that time, especially

such a devout Jew as Philo, was too imbued with the idea ot
Wisdom to overlook it.

The sacred Scriptures made too much

of "i'lisdom for anyone to discount it.

In the Book of Proverbs,

especially, we note the importance attached to Wisdom.

Since,

·therefore, Philo' s training included a thorough knoi'lledge ot,
and reverence for, the Old Testament Scriptures, ~iisdom was
bound to play a major role in his system.

It has been suggested

that Philo, as a result of his allegory, endeavored to find a
word of the feminine gender, in order to complete his picture
of the universe as the offspring of a Father (God} and a mother,

,

and that, accordingly, he adopted aotp,~ or Wisdom to denote the
feminine agency.

If we recall Philo's fondness for tinkering

with individual words, this might serve as a motive.

Indeed,

there is a passage in which Philo indicates that suoh a motive
\

\

.
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may have prompted him to make use of the term Wisdom. In his
t»eatise De Profug1s he says:
"Bethuel, which, being interpreted, means the
daughter of God, 1s a name of Wisdom. Nevertheless, Bethuel is called the father of Rebecca. How
can the daughter of God be justly termed a t~ther?
Because tho name ot wisdom is feminine, but its
nature masculine. So all the virtues have the
titles of women, but the powers and aot1ons of man;
for that which is after God, even though it be
older than all other things, 1s feminine in
comparison with that which makes the universe, the
male always having the prerogative. Hence, Wisdom,
the daughter of God, is masculine and a father,
generating in souls learning, instruction, science,
prudence, beau t_iful and laudable ac tiona." e1
But Drummond sugges t s a more practical reason, a reason
which seems to be more in keeping with Ph1lo's attempt to
commend the Hebrew Scriptures to the Greek world.

For this

reason, it is said, Ph11G found Wisdom to be a word more
serviceable to put across certain ideas. To quote Drummond's
11

It [wisdom] is almost invariably used in relation to

mankind.

It is the divine food and drink of the human soul,

words,

the dwelling-place of those that love virtue, the perfect way
of human life, the fountain from which the sciences are watered;
and even in the few passages where it is spoken of as

',

instrumental in the act of creation, .it is nearly always brought

into connection with men. It is a reasonable inference that it
I

\.

is often used on account of its more dis t inct personal
associations, and because it ~xpresses a source and torm of
character and attainment which are nots~ well indicated by
the less definite term Logos." gs Still, in Philo' s system Wisdom
87. The treatise from which this passage is taken 1s not
included in Colson and Whitaker's unfinished edition, but the
passage is quoted in Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 213.
88. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 212.
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could never take the place of Logos.

To an ordinary Jew,

Wisdom might serve the purpose, but a Greek would not be overly
impressed by this term.

Now, since Philo attempt~d a

harmonization of the two systems of thought, he, no doubt, found
the term Logos to be of more value for his purpose.

The Greeks

were acquainted with that term, and this made Philo's approach
much more direct.

If one were to attempt an analogy, a parallel

could be drawn between this attempt of Philo and the attempt of
some of the first missionaries to commend Christianity to the
Chinese by substituting Christian names for Chinese concepts.
In other words, Philo found in the term Logos a more suitable
vehicle for conveying the doctrines of Judaism to the Greeks.
It was a term more flexible, capable of being understood by
both Jews and Greeks.

The idea, then, that Philo preferred

Logos to Wisdom for practical purposes does not seem to be
too remote.
We now come to an extremely important aspect of Philo's
Logos, and, since we are again confronted by an issue that is
not settled, we should, perhaps, begin the discussion on this
point by asking the question, Is, or is not, Philo's Logos a
distinct personality?

The answer to this question will,

undoubtedly, help us to form our opinion and estimate ot Philo
as a theologian.

On this question of a personal or impersonal

Logos Philo's worth as a teacher of religion.

All the other

aspects of his Logos may or may not have importance, depending
entirely upon the answer to · this question.

From a Christian

point of view, then, the answer to this question is the criterion
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which makes Philo either a man to be studied or a. man who has
little significance, as far as Christian doctrine is concerned.
Of Ph1lo's theology oonta1ns an impersonal Logos, that is, it
his Logos is merely a metaphysical force or power, then the
best we can say of Philo is this that he was an outstanding
pagan philosopher and a great mystic.

His only contribution

to the world's thought would be, in that case, a religious
interpretation of Greek philosophy.
of our interest in him.
as a

That would be the extent

Christianity could never respect him

theologi&n, if he pietured the Medi~tor between God and

men es an impersonal world force.

On the otheT hand, if the

Logos of Philo is personal, that is, if a distinct personal
Being is to be regarded as the Mediator between the transcendent

God and the material universe, then our interest in Philo as a
religious teacher is aroused.

An impersonal Logos . has no

signific~nce for us outside of its purely intellectual and

historical aspects, but a personal Logos tends to arouse our
attention and investigation, because, whereas ~o Christianity
the former means nothing, .the latter is all-important.

And yet,

even if we were to learn that Philo conceived of the Logos as
a personal Being, we would still not be prepared to adopt his
doctrine, since his Logos may not ·be the Logos of Scripture.
These points we are now prepared to examine.
It will be recalled that in speaking of t~e divine powers,

we were compelled

to

take into account Philo's fondness for

pe~sonification. and his rhetorical style.

Add to this the

vague philosophical speculation of his day, and his method
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either becomes plausible · or it covers a multitude or sins,
depending upon the point ot view.

This applies with equal

d1rec tness to the. Lo.gos .a s personal or .impersonal.

The same

difficulties apply here as did to the "powers", since Ph1lo's
own statements .are obscure.

As a result he is accused by some

interpreters of speaking of the Logos as a second God, subordinate
to the Supreme Being, but yet a separate personality.

Again,

he is accused of vacillating between such a personal Deity and
an impersonal foroe or power.

It will be well to keep these

characteristic~ of Philo in mind, for we can.h~dly imagine that
Philo, whose entire system is based on the Logos doctrine, was
himself uncertain as to the personal or impersonal nature of
the Logos. Of such an important part of his doctrine he, no
doubt, had an established opinion, even though he is not always
consistent in teaching it.

We simply cannot always take Philo

literally, because obviously he himself did not mean to be
understood literally.

Furthermore, a literal interpretation

of Philo on this point, which would suggest a Deity subordinate
to the Supreme God, would mean that "the champion of Jewish
monotheism wanders into a vague ditheism. 11 8?w1th Philo this
would be unlikely.

Drummond also argues against a personal

Logos in Philo, attributing the vagueness and inconsistency
of language to a fondness for personification which was
reinforced by allegorical interpretation.

He remarks, "The

persons of Old Testament history become the symbols of abstract
qualities, and consequently the allegory is frequently

----·
---89. Bentwieh, op.

cit., P• 155.

I
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responsible for the ascription of personal attributes to the
general idea.

The Logos comes in for its share of this treat-

ment.«f0In his An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, Goodenough
suggests that, viewed from different angles, the Logos ban be
both personal and impersonal without involving a contradiction,
since a demand tor sharp and distinct definitions in our modern
thought was not charaoteristio of Greek philosophic speculation.
In other words, thoughts and concepts which may appear
incompatible to us may have been no problem for the ancient
philosophers.

In line with this argument, Goodenough says,

"If we are to fQllow Philo rather than ou.r own categories we
shall have to learn with h"im to answer the questions Yes and
No simultaneously.

If Philo were asked the question he would

undoubtedly have fallen baok into his pur~r metaphysics and
denied that the Logos was anything but the flow or divine
Reality, and that the Logos had no more reality in itself than
has a ray of sunshine apart from the sun.

Yet his soul was so

warmed by the Logos-ray or God that he often thought ot that ray
as a thing 1n itself, something which could be made vivid by
personification, even a rudimentary mythology, as he tr1ed to
impress the fulness ot his thought and experience." ?I ~"'urther,
in a disoussio·n as to the personal or impersonal nature ot
Philo's Logos, one must be rather cautious 1n drawing conclusions
from the writings themselves, for there are certain passages
about the Logos in Philo whioh are regarded as spurious, a fact
90. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 225.

91. An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, P• 133.

I
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which most or the editors of the text.a recognize. u.
Now. one of the arguments most used to prove that Philo
regarded the Logos as personal is the fact that

he

applies the

term angel to the logoi, the Logos presumably being the highest
angel or archangel.

In one passage 1t

is

said of the Logos,

"but let us rather call 1 t an angel or herald" ,13 and in speaking
of the logoi, he remarks, "which 1t is customary to call angels.n9f

But if we remember Philo's system

or

allegory and recall also

that the Logos is referred to by countless other names besides
angel, we can hardly conclude that, since it is called an angel,
it must be personal.

Moses, for example, also stands for the

Logos, as the common reason of mankind.

Aaron represents the

uttered Logos, the faculty of speech in man.

Even the priests

stood for reason in man, the high priest, who presided over
them all, representing the universal, cosmical Logos.

The

Logos could hardly be all these persons at the same time and

yet retain a distinct personality.

The point is that, if we

cannot strictly identify the Logos with Moses, the human mind,
the high priest, etc., then neither can we by purely literal
interpretation assume that the Logos 1s a person simply because
Philo calls it an angel, for what is literally true or one
ought to be literally true
stated.

or

another, unless otherwise

In other words, we may assume that Philo was not

attempting to personify the Logos when he refers to it as an
angel, for, as Drummond remarks, "though the Logos assumed
92. On this point see Bentwioh, op. cit., P• 156.
93. On the Life of Moses, I, 66.
94. On Dreams, I, 115.

I
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personality the moment it appeared in finite individual minds,
1 t · does not a:t all follow that the abstract idea was conceived

of' as a person."15This latter remark appears to be in line with
Philo's basic p~inciple that God was transcendent above the
Logos as well as .the universe, and could therefore in no personal
way come into contact with anything beneath Him.
Philo is he~e making t'Ull use of allegory, and the term
"angel" ought to be understood in a purely figurative sense.
In this connection we may notice two approaches to interpretation
which Philo emplqyed.

First, he speaks of the aooounts in

Scripture as h~1;1torioal facts and uses -"angels"; then, he
allegorizes and uses "logoi'', so that actually "the angel ot
scripture represents allegorically the Logos of philoaopb.y."9'
To use an analogy, the Logos may be called the angel of God
in the same sense that the powers of the human soul to think,
feel and act may be regarded as angels or messengers of the
human mind.

This rather precludes personality.

The conclusion,

then, seems to be that the Logos is not a person, but only a
rational energy or force which assumed various personalities
as it entered individual souls, or as Drummond puts it, "the
Logos is not a person, but rather an esse~ce of personality
derived from God and communicated to man, and constituting
the intermediate link or energy by which the infinite person
imparts himself to his tini te children." '17
As ~he image or God and the archetype ot man, the Logos
95. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 226.
96. Ibid ; , Vol. II, P• 270.
97. Ibid., Vol. II, P• 227.
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also appears to be a person •. Here the number seven comes into
play, ,e for the Logos 1s spoken of as "holy reason or which
Seven is the keynote."" The number seven 1s regarded as
representative of the image of Go.d , because ot all the numbers
from one to ten it alone is neither produced nor produces
another whole number by multiplication.

"It is, therefore,.

the motherless virgin, who is said to have sprung from the
head of Zeus, and remains immovable, tor all genesis consists
in movement.

But the elder Ruler and Sovereign alone neither

moves nor is moved, and consequently seven would be properly
called his image." 100 All things in the cosmos are said to be
dependent upon the number seven (the seven planets, seven
stars in the various constellations, seven days in the week,
seven-told division or the lower part of the soul, seven
internal and external organs of the body, seven modifications
of the voioe, the seventh day of creation, etc) ~01 Apparently,
then, a thought or idea 1s really God's image impressed upon
creation.

It is, functionally, the Logos itself, since we

have already seen that the Logos is God's image.

But although

it is the image of God and the archetype of man, we would not,

strictly speaking, call it a person.

To represent a number as

a person would be sheer nonsense.
98. In regard to fondness for playing with numbers, the
Pythagorean influence upon Fhilo will be noted. Throughout, Philo
speculates on the significance of numbers, putting them to as
much elaborate use as did the Pythagoreans.
99. Allegorical Interpretation, I, 16.
100. Drummond, op. o1t., Vol. II, P• 231. See also the
treatise On Creation, 100.
101. On Creation, lllff.
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Again, 1t is claimed that Ph1lo's 1dentitioation ot m.1nd 10 ~
with the Logos proves that the Logos 1s a personality.

But

this does not follow particularly, inasmuch as we have seen
that Philo speaks ot the human mind as flowing trom the divine
Reason.

In this respect the Logos is merely the higher Mind

from which all human reason is copied, the latter bearing the
stamp or seal of the former, not necessarily implying
personality, but merely indicating an abstract thought.
Our final conclusion is that the Logos or Philo is not
a distinct personality, but only the highest power, the power
which at once assembles and diffuses all other powers, emanating
from God and made objective in the universe.

This conclu~ion

seems to be most consistent with the rest ot P~ilo's system.
Particularly, is it in keeping with his basic principles ot
transcendence and immanence.

An

impersonal Logos conceivably

could escape the difficulties ot contradiction when it is made
to serve as the connecting link between an infinite God
finite univers~.

amd

a

But a personal Logos would be involved in

all manner ot inconsistencies and contradictions, tor in relation
to the world it would have to be connected 1n some way with
the universe and yet this could not be, because it is an
immaterial Divine Being, and, on the other hand, in relation
to God it would have to be bound up with Him in som.e way, which
would also be impossible beoause it is lower than God.

rhese

are the dittioulties in which a personal, philosophical Logos
is involved.

The Christian religion, because it is a religion
,..

102.

vo115
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or revelation and not o:f reason, is not aware of these
difficulties.
In its practioal aspect, Philo's Logos is too philosophical.
It is not as thoroughly pagan as the Logos ot purely Greek
philosophy, because Philo includes in his Logos concept the
idea of a transcendent God.
religious garb.

He adorns a pagan concept with a

Yet, while this religious philosopher takes

God into consideration, his Logos concept, from a Christian

standpoint, is entirely inadequate.
says,

Thus, when the evangelist

"In the beginning was the Word, and the Viard was with God,

and the Word was God,"' 03 Philo would readily agree, but when the
inspired writer says, "and the Word was made :flesh and dwelt
among us, " 101/ tqis would be entirely repugnant to Philo.
To conclude this discussion ot Philo's Logos, we quote
these words of Drummond:
"From first to last the Logos is the Thought o:f God,
dwelling subjectively in the infinite Mind, p~anted out and
made objective in the universe. The cosmos is a tissue ot'
rational force, which images the beauty, the power, the
goodness of its primeval fountain. The reason of man is
this same rational force entering into consciousness, and
held by each in proportion to the truth and variety of his
thouehts; and to follow it is the law of righteous living.
Each form which we can differentiate as a distinct species,
each rule of conduct which we can treat as an injunction
of reason, is itself a Logos, one of those innumerable
thoughts or laws into which the universal Thought may,
through self'-refleotion, be resolved. Thus, whe1·ever we
turn, these Words, which are really Works, of God confront
us, and 11ft our minds to that uniting and cosmic Thought
which, though comprehending them, is itself dependent, and
tells us of that impenetrable Being from whose
inexhaustible fulness it comes, of whose perfections it is
the shadow, and whose splendours, too dazzling for all but
the purified intuitions of the highest souls, it at once
suggests and veils.ff10~
103. John l, 1.
104. John 1, 14.
105. Philo Judaeus, Vol. II, P• 273 •
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IV

Doctrine ot Man
Thus far we have considered Philo's conception concerning
the existence and nature of God, and have then examined the
Logos, which proceeds from God.
Philo's views concerning man.
from two angles..

It remains now to look at
We may approach this subject

First ot all, we shall examine briefly

Philo's views on man as one ot the beings belonging to creation
and, secondly, the more important or the two, attempt to learn
what Philo has to say about man as a moral being.

In his theory of man as a natural obj~ct or creation Fhilo
manifests a dualism.

Like Plato, he is very explicit in

ascribing to man two parts - soul and body.' His ideas concerning
the characteristics ot man's body, no doubt, flowed from the
theories which were current in his day among Greek philosophers.
Certainly, he did not get his ideas from Moses.

In one or his

treatises he describes man's body thus: ·
"i'hose who have most carefully examined the facts
or nature say that the four elements are
proportionally equal, and that the whole world
received and retains for ever i~s frame, through
being compounded according to this same
proportion, which assigned an equal measure to
each of the parts. They tell us, too, that our
tour constituents, dry, wet, cold and hot, have
been mixed and harmonized by proportional equality
and that we ar·e nothing more than a compound of
the tour factors mixed on this principle."i
It is clear from this passage that man's body consisted
of the same tour elements out of which the universe was oreated,
and for that reason was, like the universe, corruptible.
1. Cf. Allegorical Interpretation, III, 161.
2. Who is the Heir ot Divine Things, 152-153.

I

Turning to the other element oonsti tu ting man's make-up,
the soul, we find that this, too, is divided into several parts.

Here, however, Philo becomes somewhat ambiguous, for at times
ho speaks oi' a three-fold division of the soul, while on other

occasions he emphasizes a two-fold division.

But the d1tf1culty

or

usually disappears, if we observe his point

view.

When

referring to the f'Unotion of the soul, he speaks of the latter
as having three parts or properties - sense perception, mental

representation (which is the impression of the sense perception
on the soul}, and impulse (which may result in desire or aversion).
But

when referring to the oomposi tion of th'e soul, Philo speaks

of a two-fold division, the rational and irrational parts, the
former being divine, the latter corruptible.

In this respect

.man and the animals differ, for, whereas both enjoy the
1rra tional part or ·the vital pr1no1ple, man alone possesses

that higher part, the rational principle.

On the surface, then,

there is an apparent ambiguity in the use of the word "soul".
I think, however, the distinction may be explained by viewing

each under its proper aspect - the three-fold division in its
functional aspect and the two-fold division in its essential
aspect.

or, from another angle, mien man 1s viewed as an

object of creation, his soul consists of three parts, but when
he 1s looked upon as a moral being, the two-fold division
obtains.
Now Just because Philo is so deeply interested in man as
a moral being and speaks at greut length about ethics, he
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usually adheres to the two-told division of man's soul. 3
Accordingly, our impression of Philo on this point would be
quite correct, if we regarded this two-told division as permanent
and established w.i th him.

For practical purposes, it is the

division that he observes.
As far as the composition of the irrational part of the
soul is concerned, we have little information from Philo's
writings.

Drummond resorts to one of the Greek fragments,

however, and says that Philo, basing his views on tbe authority
of Moses,~ regarded this lower, mortal part of the soul as
"strictly consisting of air, which is inextricably mingled
with the blood."s With regard to its function, we may refer to
Philo's treatise On Creation and there observe that the interior
part of the soul is in turn divided into seven parts - the five
senses, and the faculties of speech and reproduction.' Here
Philo evidently borrows from the Stoics, who also conceived ot
a seven-fold division of the soul. 7

But the h1¢iest and sovereign part of the soul is the
rational part.

The most usual, though ·not exclusive, term

5. Philo's references to the three-fold division of the
soul are rare. One instance is an allegorical interpretation of
Gen. 15 found in Allegorical Interpretation, III, 39ff. My own
opinion is that such a · di~ision was introduaed merely as another
point of contact with Greek philosophy. In other words, Philo
occasionally adopted tµis tripartite division (already used by
Plato and Aristotle) merely as an aoo.ommadat:ton to Greek thought.
4. Genesis 9,4; Deu~. 12,23.
5. Op. oit., Vol. I, P• 321.
6. \117.

7.

er.

Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy,
P• 218.
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applied to this rational part 01' the soul 1s mind ( yov.5 ) •
Indeed, "it is the masculine portion within us, while the
irrational part ia feminine." 8 However, Philo himself admits
that we cannot be too certain as to the exact essence of the
mind.

This he expresses in the following passage:
"The mind that is in each or us can apprehend other
objects, but is incapable of knowing itself. For
just as the eye sees other objects but does not see
itself, so the mind too perceives other objects,
but does not apprehend itself. Can it say what it
is and of what kind, breath or blood or fire or air
or anything else? Can it even say that it is a
body or else that it is incorporeal? Are not they
simpletons, then, -who inquire about God's substance'?
For how should those, who kno,v not the substance or
their own soul, have accurate ideas about the soul
of the universe? For we may conceive of God as the
soul of the universe."f
And yet, in opposition to materialism, he tried to show

that Moses, recognizing a two-fold division of the soul, taught
that the rational part was "spirit."· Once again appealing to
the authority of Moses, Philo says,
"'lfo the faculty which we have in common with the
irrational creatures blood has been given as its
essence; but to the faculty which streams. forth
from the fountain of reason breath has been
assigned; not moving air, but, as it were, an
impression stamped by the divine power, to which
Moses gives the appropriate title of 'image•, thus
indicating that God is the Archetype of rational
existence, while man is a copy and likeness. 1°
11

This passage is highly significant, because it contains
a clear picture of Philo's opinion on the rational part of the
soul.

But there is something else here that claims our attention.

While it is clear from the preceding discussion that the

a.

Drummond, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 324.
9. Allegorical Interpretation, I, 91.
10. The Worse Attacks the Better, 83.

I
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irrational part of the soul, which ia shared by the animals,
is formed from matter, the rationeJ. part, Philo implies, is
divine, since it was breathed into man by God.
has part of the Divine Spirit within him.

In a word, man

This theory of

emanation, apparently, was an established conviction with Philo,
for in the treatise just referred to he goes on to say that the
only reason that the mind of man, being so small, could "have
room for all the vastness of sky and universe" is this that
it must be

"an inseparable portion of that divine and blessed
soul. For no part of that which is divine cuts
itself off and becomes separate, but does but extend
itself. The mind, then, having obtained a share ot
the perfection which is 1n the whole, 'When it
conceives of the universe, reaches out as widely as
the bounds of the whole, and undergoes no severance;
for its force is expansive.""
All this, of course, prepares the way for Philo's theory
as to how man comes into intimate relation with God.

It man's

soul, at least the rational part of it, is of divine origin,
then it has direct aoceas to God.

Indeed, man is but a step

from reaching God.
But there 1s another implication.

If the sovereign part

of the soul is of divine origin, this suggests its pre-existence.
Philo firmly believed this.

He speaks of two classes of souls

that inhabit the air (ct. p. 63).

Some, for reasons unknown,

descend into mortal bodies on earth and dwell in those bodies
for fixed periods, after which they return to the air.

Others,

more p1.tre, remain in the air, keeping aloof' f'rom all mortal
11. The Worse Attacks the~ett_t!!:, 90.
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oontactia Just why certain ones, and not others, descend to
earth Philo does not seem to explain, nor is he very clear as
to why some men receive good souls. and others evil.

His only

explanation, according to Drummond, is that there must be "an
original ditferenoe in moral qual1 ty among souls" .'3 And yet,
we cannot ascribe any moral evil to any ot these legitimate
incorporeal spirits.

Only those false soul's who "slip into

·the name of angels", but are not worthy of' the name, oan be
called evil.

It is almost selt-ev1dent to remark that Philo also believed
in the immortality of the soul.

The pre-existent soul

descends into the human body, sojourns there for a definite
time and returns to the air.'" The benefit derived from 1 ts
descent is not exP,lained, although it has been suggested that

"such rare spirits can have come only for the sake of seeing
and learning; and when they have personally observed all
perceptible and mortal things, and thus added to ·their stock
of wisdom, they return to the place whence they oam.e."'sAnother mark which distinguishes man from the animals is
man's possession of will.

This Philo teaches in the following

passage:
"For it 1s mind alone which the Father who begat it
judged worthy of freedom, and loosening the fetters
of necessity, suffered it to range as it listed,
and of that free-will which is His most peculiar
possession and most worthy of His majesty gave it
such portion as it was capable of receiving. For
12. Cf. On the Confusion of Tongues, 176-177; see also
On Dreams, I, 138-141.
13. Op. cit., I, P• 338.
14. Cf. On Creation, I, 138-139.
15. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. I, P• 337.
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the other living creatures in whose souls the mind,
the element a.e t apart for liberty, has no place,
have been oomm1tted under yoke and bridle to the
service of men, as slaves to a master. But man,
possessed ot a spontaneous and self-determined will,
whose activities for the most part rest on deliberate
choice, is with reason blamed for what he does wrong
with intent, praised when he acts rightly of his own
will. In the others, the plants and enimals, no
praise is due if they bear well, nor blame if they
fare 111: for their movements and changes in either
direction come to them from no deliberate choice or
volition of their own. But the soul of man alone
has received from God the faculty of voluntary
movement, and in this way especially is made like to
him, and thus being liberated, as far as might be,
from that hard and ruthless mistress, necessity, may
justly be charged with guilt, in that it does not
honour 1 ts Liberator. • • He [Goo] had made him
free and unfettered, to employ his powers of action
with voluntary and deliberate choice for this
purpose, that, knowing good and evil and receiving
the conc·e ption of the · noble and the base, and
setting himself in sincerity to apprehend just and
unjust and in general what belongs to virtue and
what ·to vice, he might practice to choose the
better and esche'\'.' tne opposite. n/6
N'ot only was man, unlike the animals, created W1 th a

ratimnal principle, but he is distinguished by his mode of
conduct.

The animals act only from instinct and, under given

circumstances, respond only in one way; man has the ability to
consider a.l ternatives and to prefer one action to another ..
This means also that, whereas animals cannot be held accountable for moral evil, man is responsible for wrong-cloing, and
he ought "to choose the better and eschew the opposite." 17

These are some of the more general aspeots of Philo's
conception of the essence of man.

Consisting of both body and

soul, man is in this respect on a level with the animals.

Yet

he ~s distinguished from the animal creation inasmuch as he
16. on the Unohangeableness of God, 47-49.
17. or. neut. 30, 15.19.
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possesses a rational principle, particularly, sinoe this
rational, or sovereign, principle, is ot divine origin.

In

this respect man_ 1s taken out of the category of animals and
is regarded a-s ~ moral being with definite reepons1b111t1ee

and desires.

From these oons1derations it 1s but a step into the field
of ethics and to the study of man as a moral being.

Here we

shall see what Philo's views were in regard to man's coming
into union with God and how man is conditioned, so that he may
be capable of having communion with the Divine.

Here also

Fh1lo passes from philosophy to mysticism.

We have just discussed the dualistic nature of man, and we
need only refer to the philosophy of lllln's creation, in order
to complete the picture of his appearance upon the phenomenal
scene.

As a disciple of Moses, Philo, of course, could not

overlook the Mosaic teaching that man was created in God's

image.

Yet, influenced by Greek philosophy, Plato in particular,

he injects into the words of Moses his own philosophical notions.
Accordingly, just as every object of nature had its ideal pattern
in the perceptible world, so man himself was created according
to an archetype, the generic man,

Appealing to scripture, Philo

says that the oord "created"'' indicates that God first made the
generic man according to His own 1.mage, while the word "tormed"''
shows that subsequently the species, Adam, was molded out ot
clay.

To this theory Fhilo gives expression in the following
18. Cf. Genesis 1, 27.
19. or. Genesis 2, 7.
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words:

~''l'ha. t what were created in the first instance were
genera, is ev1den~ from the words employed, 'Let
the earth bring forth the living soul', not
according to species but 'aooording to kind'. And
\Ve find Him in every instance working 1n this way.
Before the species He completes the genera. He
does so in the case of man. Having first fashioned
man as a genus, in which the prophet says that
t here is the male ~nd the female genus, He afterwards makes Adam, the finished form or speoies.nJo
In other words, the archetypal man was made in God's image,
while the earthly man was only an imperfect reproduction or the
ideal man}' In keeping with Scripture, Fhilo regards Adam, the
first earthly man, as having been created good and beautiful •.u
However, this cannot be said of Adam's descendants for the
simple reason that they were born of human beings, while Adam
was created directly by God.

As a matter of fact, from

Adam

on down, the passing generations decreased in goodness.4 3 In
reality, this downward tendency began with Adam himself, because
he made a wrong choice, having selected the evil instead of the
good, so that in all succeeding generations "an increasing
dimness has fallen upon the powers an~ qualities both of body
and soul.""'"
Yet this original guilt does not mean total depravity.
Philo does not teach the total corruption of man.

On the

20. !!!es orical I~te~pretation, II, 13.
21. Drummond calls attention to the fact that this involves
a difficulty regarding the pre-existent soul. Philo believes that
man's soul is pre-existent, but he also says that God breathed
i nto man the brea th oi lif e. He makes no a t tempt to explain
this. Cf. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 277.
22. er. on creation, 135-150.
23. This entire subject of nan's degeneracy is explained
in the treatise On Creation.
24. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 279.
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contrary, he has a high opinion ot man's spiritual worth.

Man

was created in the image of God, that is, the Logos, and through
this image or Logos he comes into relationship with God.

His

own reason is a pattern ot this Logos, which is the archetype
of human reason.

Furthermore, the sovereign part ot man's soul,

being a fragment of the Divine, retains its divine potentialities.
Even the most lowly and abominable men are not entirely without
the ability to do good and to come into communion with the

Divine, if they want to do so.

On this point Philo remarks:

"For when He rains upon the sea, and causes springs
to gush forth in the depths of the desert, and waters
the poor and rough and barren soil, pouring on it
rivers with their overflowings, what else does He
prove save the exceeding greatness of His own wealth
and goodness? This is the reason for which He
oreated no soul b~rren of virtue, even if the
exercise of it be to some impossible." ~s
Thus, God has made every soul with some good in it, so that
"none are wholly desti t~:t e of visitings of the divine Spirit".~'
It is the duty or each individual~ then, to use this good, to

make the right decisions and to r'e ject the evil and choose the

goodf1 This can be done, according to Philo, because man has a
higher ~nd a lower nature, which offer the possibilities of
choosing either good or evil.

But now the question arises, what, in Philo's opinion,
constitutes the good for which man is to strive, and what is
25. Allegorical Interpretation, I, 34.
26. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 280.
'
27. Here the contrast between the theology of Philo and that
of Faul is evident. While Fhilo makes good and evil a matter ot
personal oho ice, Paul says, ''the good that I would I do not; but
the evil which I would not, that I do." ( Rom. 7, 19) •

I
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the evil that he ought to shun?

Regarding the torm.er, it is

assumed that the highest good concerns the soul, the sovereign
principle in man, because this sovereign part ot man's soul is
the determining tactor· in man's nature.

Henoe, the highest

good must be something spiritual, as opposed to that which
satisfies the body.

This highest good, Philo believes, is to

be found in happiness or blessedness.

In the treatise

On Rewards and Punishments he says,

"The hope ot happiness incites also the devotees ot
virtue to study wisdom, believing that thus they
will be able to discern the nature of all that
exists and to act in accordance ~~th nature and so
to bri.n g to their tulness the best types or lite,
·the contemplative and the prs.ctical, which
necessarily make their possessor a happy man."~e
From this passage it is apparent that a state ot happiness

is the goal of the righteous man.

But this can be found only

through the practice of virtue, so that virtue really becomes
an end in itself /

9

Indeed, we are told that "the man of worthy

aims sets himself to acquire day for the sake or day, light for
t he sake of light, the beautiful for the sake of the beautiful
alone, not for the sake or something else • • • for this is
the divine law, to value excellence for its own sake. " 30 But to
practice and enjoy virtue is to attain to only a portion of
the highest good.

It is excellent for the ordinary truth-

seeker, but 1t cannot satisfy ·the deeply religious man.

For

28. On Re wards and Puniahments, 11.
29. Whether Philo was "influenced" by the Stoies on this
point we are not prepared to say, but thera is a resemblance to
Stoie ethics, specifically, in regard to the virtues. Ct. Zeller,
Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, P• 219f.
30. Allegorical Interpretation, III, 167.
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the latter, it 1s only preliminary to his attainment ot a
higher goal, whioh is to praotioe virtue tor the sake ot
honoring God.

Obviously, there is a distinction in degrees

of spirituality, for "in the lower stage of moral progress
we are instructed not to neglect what is established as

righteous by ordinance and universal repute, but when we have
risen high enough to understand the lessons of right reason,
we are ·taugh t to honour the Father of all" •31 Mow, the only

way in which ,1e can honor God is ·to do the things that please
Him, and ·to try to follow Him in the ways that the virtues
1ndicate!4 And so, our supreme goal is to follow C--od and to
imitate Him as far as this is possible. 3 ~
However, in order to do this, man must at the same time
overcome the forces of evil.
of the nature or evil.
love.

This leads to a consideration

With Philo, the greatest evil is selt-

Turning to oneself or to that which is begotten is the

logical alternative o:t' seeking after God.
God takes refuge in himself.''

"He who flees from

Nor can one claim to be the

victim of error or ot ignorance in his thinking.
circumstances can be introduced.

No mitigating

Either a man strives to

Follow God or he is guilty of self-love.

This Fhilo states

emphatically in the following passage:
"We must indeed reject all those who 'beget tor themselves', that is all those who pursue only their own
profit and think not of othe~s. For they think
31. Drummond, op~ cit., Vol. II, p. 286.

er. on

creation, 143-144.
~3. This living according to God clearly resembles the
Stoical maxim, "Live conform.ably to nature."
32.

I
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themselves born tor themselves only and not tor the
innumerable others, tor father, tor mother, for
wife, for ohildren, tor country, for the human race,
and if we must extend the 11st, for heaven, for
earth, tor the universe, tor knowledge, tor virtues,
for the Father and Captain or all; to each of whom
we are bound acoording to our powers to render what
is due, not holding all things to be an adjunct ot
ourselves, bu.t rather ourselves an adjunct of all." 3 '
When 1t is asked what the sources of all evil are, Philo
gives several answers.

To begin with, the most general source

or evil is attributed to ·the rao t that man belongs to the

phenomenal world and is thus exposed to evil.

God, of course,

is eternal and holy, and by contrast everything finite is
transient and corrupt.

Yet, aooording to Philo, man 1~ not

altogether sinful, because he has the element
the sovereign part of his soul.

or

the Divine in

Moreover, by virtue of this

"reason" within him, man has the privilege and the ability to
choose between goodness and evil.

If he chooses evil, it is

only because he has beoome too closely associated with the
mortal element, which is the body.

NQ~ this mortal element,

the body, hinders man's spiritual aspirations, not because it
is material, but because "it 1s phenomenal, transient, mortal,
and therefore antithetic to that ,vorld of eternal ideas amid
which reason lives, and where alone the virtues ·oan b~ won." 35
Apparently, .Philo was not ready to ascribe evil to matter.
Indeed, this would be ·contrary to his principle that everything
that God made was good.

Matter itself, being pre-existent, was

not 1ntr1ns1oally evil.

Nor, as we have seen, did it become

evil through any such thins a~ a Fall, beoause, aooording
34. On the Unchangeableness of God, 19.
35. Drummond, op. oi t., Vol. II, ·P • 297.
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to Philo, man's degeneracy 1s due only to his exercise ot the
wrong oho1ce.

And so, it is only because the body is phenomenal

that 1t is opposed to the soul.

Of course, this is purely

philosophical reasoning and does not agree with the Scriptural
account of man's Fall.

Man's goal is to escape from

participation in the phen()JJlenal existence and to strive to
associated with the incorporeal and incorruptible life.

ee

This

means that the senses are not only to be controlled, but they
are to be abandoned. 3 "

In a practical way, then, the body is only a prison or
tomb which contains the real man, in which the soul dwells as
a sojourner.37 It is not merely passive or neutral in the strites

and battles between wickedness and goodness, but it is a
definite hindrance, preventing man's soul trom enjoying the
freedom of full communion with God.

In this respect the body

is evil, "not intrinsically, but because it acts as an impediment

to the higher aspirations of' the soul, and, through its
necessities, draws off our attention, and sometimes our allegiance,
from that which is spiritual. 38
Now, if the body itself, because of its association with
the phenomenal world, is evil, hou much more evil are not the
lesser things attached to this worldl

Again, moral evil is

not inherent in these things ( for eve.ry_thing that God made was
good), but they become evil when the soul attaches more importance
to them the.n to God, or when we "make them rather than reason
36. Allegorical Interpretation, III, 151ft.
37. Allegorical Interpretation, III, 69.
38. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 299.
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a standard ot reterenoe.• "

Thus. the senses and the passions,

too, can be definite hindrances in man's spiritual lite.

In the

same treatise, to which we have eeen lately referring, Fhilo
speaks of the passions as being neither aorally good nor morally
bad, but occupying a neutral position!' Evil men use them ae
ends in themselves; righteous men reeard them only as necessities.

Accordingly, the passions are evil, not 1n themselves, but 1n
the use that is made of them.

It will not be necessary to go

into Phiio•s psychology of the passions, yet it should be noted
that Philo recognizes two kinds - good and bad.

The former he

calls ra·tional and the latter irrational," 0 which, in view ot

wha ·t has been said above about the difference between the
rational and the irrational elements, explains why they are good
and bad.

In general, however, all passions are to be checked,

because they are opposed to reason and sober judgment, because
they too easily lead men to regard them as ends in themselves.
The highest good of the soul is to know God, but the passions
obscure this knorvledge.
Another source of evil is ignorance, of which there are
two kinds. From simple ignorance men may oommit evil deeds
involuntarily, which oould not be re~rded as having merit or
demerit.

The same may be said of praiseworthy actions. Whether

Hlilo intends to exouse wicked acts on the ground of ignorance
is not clear, but he believes that for this reason we have a
conscience within us, which is an unerring accuser and judge.
According to Drummond, "Philo's own opinion was that the
39. Allego~1cal Interpretatio~, III, 67-68.
40. Drummond, op. 01~ •• Vol. II, P• 303t.
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wrongfulness of acts remained, and that actions might, in the
abstract, be classified as right and wrong, although, when they
were done in ignorance, one could not attach merit or demerit
to the individual performing them." 141 The other kind of ignorance
1s the result of soph1stioat1on and false conceit, and this

produces voluntary acts of wrong, which are, of course, sinful.
For these man is held aocountable.
From the progress

or

the foregoing discussion we have

arrived at the oonolusion that, according to Philo, man 1s
inherently, at least potentially, good.

He has freedom of

choice and can elevate himself to the height of beholding God.
By quenching the desires and passions, the soul can come into
intimate communion with the Divine and can attain virtue.

In

refJlrd to the latter, Philo speaks of three methods by which
virtue may be attained, and 1n an allegort he sets up the three
patriarchs as examples."~ Abraham, it is said, symbolizes
instruction or learning. Through a process or education Abraham
was led to God, and was rewarded with faith.

different way.

He

Isaac chose a

symbolizes intuition or self-taught wisdom,

and his reward was continual joy in God.
of asceticism and laborious practice.

J·acob chose the way

This is the method

employed by all those who are not entirely free from the passions.
But it has its reward, for Jacob's name was changed to Israel,
the name of perfection, which means "the vision of God." And
so all three arrived at the same goal, "the direct or mystic
vision of God", but ·they used different means, according to
41. Drummond, op. cit., Vo1. II, P• 294.
42. Cf. On the Change of Names, 88.
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their own individual nature.
But before drawing our final conclusion as to Ph1lo's way
or salvation (if suoh it can be called),

it should be noted

that Philo considers God also to be an active agent in man's
attainment of virtue.

While adhering generally to the Stoic

principle that the man who follows reason arrives at virtue,
Philo differs in cne point, in that he regards man as needing
God's help to escape from the senses and the passions.
does not contradict anything that has been said.

This

Rather, it

agrees with the principles of his system, particularly, with
the function of the Logos, whose duty it is to guide man in
the paths of right reason.

Since the Logos is reason or the

law, it acts as an ally to man, oharting the proper course
along wb1oh man shou1d walk. This is expressed thus:
For 1 t must needs be that while· the perfect man
moves of himself towardo virtuous actions, the
man who is practicing should do so with the aid
of reason [11l0 ovJ which g1 ves hirn guidance what he
should do, obedience to whose directions is a
noble thing." 43
11

Accordingly, the Pentateuch itself beoame a group of logoi,
or divine thoughts, whose purpose is to guide men.

In this

connection Philo even speaks of the grace of God, which moves
the soul to pleasant thoughts and bestows love for acquiring
the morally good/" It is not due entirely to man himself that
he attains the virtues, but "it is Go<l who through the
instrumentality of the intermediary powers plants and fosters
the virtues in the soul of man. ""s And so, man works out ois
43. Allegorical Interpretation, III, 144.
44. ~llegorical Interpretation, III, 136-137.
45. Fairweather, op. oit., ~lt(J.'l .~AFF l\'U.,1v1L}(lAL Llb~I()
COI COK~'lA SEMIN.A..RY
ST. LOUIS. M •

I
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own blessedness aided by the grace and instrumentality of God.
We have yet one more point to discuss, and that is Philo's
view of the final results of life.

Here we find no doctrine of

a future world, for the universe, according to -Philo, will not
be destroyed. Nothing in creation dies because everything was
made good and beautiful and remains incorruptible!' With Philo,
the law of retribution 1-s absolute, so that "a wicked man will
not lose the reward of a single good deed, theugh accompanied
by so many that are evil, nor may a good man rely upon his
numero~s good deeds to free him from chastisement, if in any
instance he acted wickedly; for God renders everything by balance

and weight."~7 Thus, the wicked man is given up to his own desires
and pleasures a.nd lives a life of' sin. . The commonly accepted
idea of Hades was with Philo a mere table; "the true Hades is the
life of the wi~ked man, exposed to vengeance, with unoleansed
guilt, obnoxiou.s to every cu.r se. ""'g The supreme penalty of the .

wicked man. is seen 1n· these words:

"That he should live forever · 1n a state of dying and
so to speak suffer a death which is ~eathless and
unending • • • so that never by any chanQe he should
have any plea sgnt sen~at1ons o~ desire anything
pleasant, and engrafted in him only the pair [ot
passions] on the bad side, producing grief unmixed
with cheerfulness and fear unrelieved."~'
For the rig;1t~ou:ei ,

on

r. rhis is true, first of all,

the one hand, there

or· the

righteous

·1s

as

great reward.
0

a people or rac e.s

46. er . On Creation, 82; see also Who is the He1·r of Divine
. Things, 152.
47. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, ·P• 322 .
48. Ibid., Vol. II, P• 322
49. on Rewards and Punishments, 70-71.
50. er. On Rewards and Punishments, 85-126.

.
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They will be blessed with prosperity, happiness, peace and long
.

.

life.

All the people ot Israel will finally be assembled to

their own land and V11ll enjoy the vision of God.SI It will be the
final triumph of goo~ over the forces of evil.

That Philo's

speculations on thi~ subject are rather vague can readily be
seen.
Jew.

Yet behind these speculations can also be seen Philo the
True to h1~ Jewisn belief, he ree,arded the people of Israel

as the chosen race.

They are th~ people who will reach the

ultimate goo~ and nill behold God.

But he did not exclude other

nations from the possibility of receiving this reward.

It is

true, the Israelites had the prerogative, yet all could share in
these blessings on the condition that they accepted the God of
Israel and the teachings or Moses.

On this account he tried to

adapt the teachings or Moses to Greek speculation, and to show
that Moses had the true way ot life.
When we inquire into the reward gained by the individual,
we are introduced to Philo's doctrine or ecstacy.
good which

man

The highest

can attain is to be absorbed in the divine vision

and to lose all consciousness of self and of the world, to
receive the illumination of God into ourselves and allow it to
worlc upon us /l In moments of rapture the righteous man rises

.51. I ·t has been suggested that in thia doctrine lies Philo' s
theory of the Messianic hope. On this point I have found three
opinions expressed. Bentwich declares that "this, i.adeed, is the
form in which he conceives the Messianic hope." (op. cit., P• 149).
Ewald also recognizes the possibility that this may be Philo' s
conception of the Messiah, but he adds, "the Messianic hopes are
practically dissipated. 11 ( op. oi·i;. • P• 234). Drummond, on the
other hand, fails to see any traoe of a Messianic hope, and declares
that nthe identification of the Logos with the Messiah appears to
me to bs quite untenable." (op. o1t., Vol. II, P• 322).
52. c:r. Zeller, Outlines or the History of Greek Philosophy,
P• 263.
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contemplation

or

Deity."

This is the height of bliss, for there

can be nothing higher, according to Philo, than to commune
"alone with the Alone."

The righteous souls are emancipated trom

every·thing sensual, and, as a result, they "come to the
Unbegotten and Eternal, the city of God, the mystical Jerusalem,
which signifies the vision

or

peace; and this is nothing less

than the vision of God himself, fo_r God alone is peaoe." SJ
As a closing remark, we quote these words ot Drummond:
nFrom the point of view, then, of mere human
philosophy, ,Philo deliberately adopts the formula
of ·the Skeptics; and if' instead or being a
Skeptic he was an Eclectic, this result was due
to hi s recognition ·o.f a supernatural source of'
knowledge in the Holy Soriptures. That knowledge
of ·the Supreme which the rp.ost approved pllilosophy
taught to her votaries came to the Jews through
laws and customs in fulfillment of a divine
promise. The faith which he derived from this
venerable .source was brought by Blilo as a teat
to the great problems of p,iU.osophy; and it· he
believed that it was possi~le, through a wisely
direot.eQ. culture, to attain to the clear and
direct intuition of truth, it was here that he
recognized the ultimate ground or certitude ..
The learning of the Greeks only supplied the
mould in which h1s thought was cast; the material
was dra,m from the best traditions of Hebrew
piety. · And while he endeavoured to justify by
philosophical reasoning the revelations of faith,
it was always as a Jewish believer and disciple
of Moses that he addressed his appeal to his
countrymen and to mankind."S~

53. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 323.
54. Op. cit., Vol. I, P• 359.
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